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RESUME
Le sujet de ce mémoire s'inscrit dans le cadre de la mesure de la confiance d'un
agent logiciel. Les systèmes multi-agents actuels ne prennent pas en considération les
problèmes de cohabitation entre un utilisateur et son agent virtuel agissant en son nom,
telles que la confiance mutuelle et la délégation sécuritaire de tâches. Ainsi, la cohabitation
utilisateur-agent nécessite une compréhension mutuelle, ce qui signifie que les deux entités
devraient être aptes à comparer leurs points de vue ou opinions respectifs avant la
délégation d'une tâche commune. Pour répondre à cette problématique, le modèle théorique
proposé utilise la logique terminologique comme une approche ontologique pour garantir
l'égalité sémantique de leurs opinions avant la mesure du degré de confiance mutuelle. Ce
modèle non seulement réduit au minimum la communication entre l'usager et son agent
mais aussi constitue une solution pour la délégation sécuritaire de tâches. Le cas concret
servant de validation concerne le domaine du commerce électronique.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In our lives, trust is a common phenomenon. Every day, we make trusting decisions
many times [Luhmann, 1979]. For example, every morning we go to work and we believe
we can get there, after work we trust we can come back home, and so on. Thus, we can see
trust as an important concept, at the same time it is also a confusing concept, which is
difficult to define. This thesis is concerned with the introduction of a formalism to give a
definition and way to measure the degree of trust. It approaches the concept from the point
of view of an artificial intelligent agent domain. An agent is a program able to make its
own decisions (autonomous), to move on the network, to exchange the information with
other agents, learning, etc. The Multi-Agents Systems (MAS) is concerned by the design of
agents of organizing collectively to achieve the functionalities which are required [Chaib-
Draa et al, 1992] [Ferber, 1995] [Wooldridge, 2000]. Trust has been studied extensively in
multi-agent systems [Marsh, 1994] [Elfoson, 1998] [Jonker and Treur, 1999] [Schillo et al,
2000], where it means an agent has with respect to the dependability/capabilities of some
other agent (maybe itself). We are also primarily concerned with how an agent can use the
degree of trust in reasoning about cooperation.
Today, more and more application areas require systems that are able to interact
with its users. Socially Intelligent Agents (SIA) are agent systems that are able to connect
and interface to humans, for instance, they can find themselves in the role of observer,
assistant, collaborator, competitor, customer, etc. The importance of such work is
demonstrated in application areas such as e-commerce, agents for training, learning and
therapy environments. Therefore, in delegation of task to the agent, the user needs an action
of the agent and includes it in his own plan in order to achieve the goal through the agent.
In all these application areas the user's attitudes towards the agent, in terms of believability,
credibility, trust, etc., are important factors that determine the acceptance and success of
such a system and its utility in real-world applications [Kerstin, 2000]. One of the major
problems of this cohabitation relates to the measure of mutual trust between the user and
the agent acting on his behalf.
The general objective of our research is to find out a computational model of trust
based on comparing from the viewpoints of the user and those of the agent, before the
takeover of a task. A viewpoint is an opinion resulted from a terminological
conceptualization [Nebel, 1995] of beliefs, goals and action plans to carry out a task. In
other words, we want to find those factors, which influence trust. Trust is multi-
dimensioned which concerns many different attributes such as reliability, dependability,
security, honesty, etc [Grandison and Sloman, 2000]. Hosvever, we want to judge the trust
depending on the similarity of viewpoints of the user and agent in order to take into account
the competence factor of the agent and to translate the problem of measuring trust to the
classification of opinions based on terminological logic [Nebel, 1995] [Baader et al, 2003].
Therefore, our prime objective consists in giving our hypothesis and formulae according to
some literature theories and practical investigation. The second objective is about the
comparison between the similarity in agents' viewpoints. This comparison will help us to
achieve our goal to use the formula to calculate trust. Finally, our last objective consists of
validating the proposed approach on a concrete case, which relates to the electronic
commerce.
It takes several steps to achieve these goals. At first, we presented a detailed review
related to the existing methods of trust, such as the Marsh's work [Marsh, 1994], which
proposes an analytical approach to trust. This formalism provides a tool for measuring trust
and its applicability in the MAS domain. This work is a step in the direction of a proper
understanding and definition of human trust. The work of Castelfranchi and Falcone
[Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2001] is about social trust. It focuses on a cognitive approach
to trust. The work has shown how trust is the mental background of delegation in their
relationship, and it implies trust has been derived from its reference to a goal from the
action of delegating and from the uncertainty of trust-beliefs. A distributed cognition
approach comes from Chandrasekharan's work [Chandrasekharan, 2002], which considers
trust as a distributed cognition problem. It also suggests an agent design framework
inspired by distributed cognition as well as a programming language that can act as an
institution to partially solve the trust problem. We have also made an investigation into the
relationship between trust and security by analyzing the work of Pavlou [Pavlou and
Ramnath, 2002], which supposes trust is influenced by perceived information security and
distinguishes it from the objective assessment of security threats. Finally, we look at the
study of the relationship between trust and risk by the work of [Griffiths and Luck, 1999]
[Gefen et al., 2003], which emphasizes that cooperation inherently involves an element of
risk, due to the unpredictable nature of other's behavior, and they suppose some formula to
show the relationship between trust and risk.
These models propose a general framework for automated trust. Nevertheless, they
have not taken into account the specificity of the user in cohabitation with the agent acting
on his behalf, because the divergence of the opinions between them is not necessarily
conflicting. It can be seen like two different interpretations of the same reality and it
becomes impossible to trust entirely one or the other [Bouzouane, 2002]. For instance, in e-
commerce, these two entities (agent and user) have common goal which consists of
purchasing product. The plan of the agent may be partial. We suppose that the agent
decides to supply the product but it did not yet choose the provider. It plans to find a set of
wholesalers, negotiate a price and a method for the payment, checks the product and finally
determines the date of supplying a product. On the other hand, the user who maybe wishes
to intervene in order to take control of the transaction by proposing a similar plan but with
other constraints such as the date of supply of the selected item and the supplier of the
product are known. These two opinions are similar even though they use different
vocabularies and constrains. For example, the actions of «contact supplier» and «find
wholesalers» are semantically similar. Therefore, rather than communicating directly with
the agent or losing the control to benefit of the user, we propose to measure the mutual trust
the commercial transaction takes place. In our second step, we thus put forward our formula
based on the comparison of the viewpoint concepts between user and agent by using the
terminological logic to guarantee their semantic equality between the viewpoints and then
measure the trust in order to ensure a safe delegation of common task.
Finally, we realize an application by using as a validation relates to the electronic
commerce.
The following chapter 2 presents a deeper discussion about our subject and
introduces the concept of trust. We also present a comprehensive survey of much of the
literature on trust. We want to provide an understanding of what work has been done with
trust. Formalism is a major contribution to these works, which provides a tool for the
discussion and clarification of trust; using this formalism, we are able to ascertain whether
what we are representing is "trust" and modify it accordingly.
Chapter 3 is about the agent. It constitutes a state on the cooperation in an agent's
society. Also, it introduces the basic notions of the field and presents a review of the
various methods of cooperation previously quoted. This chapter also make it possible to
position our work in this field of cooperation in multi-agent systems. In addition, we
introduce the BDI model [Rao and Georgeff, 1992], which has inspired our work.
Chapter 4 consists of our contribution in the trust domain and makes it possible to
present a formal model of mutual trust between user and his agent acting on his behalf.
Initially, we present the basic concepts of the proposed approach, followed by a formal
formula of the model. Finally, a concrete case is used to validate our model, which relates
to the electronic commerce is presented. Also, we present a conclusion of some of the
results obtained from implementations of formalism. Let us mention that an article,
presented in the Seventh international conference on International Association of Science
and Technology for Development (IASTED'03) [Bouzouane, Bouchard and Shen, 2003].
The general conclusion of this thesis make it possible to present the assessment of
our contribution to the advance of the field as well as the new ways of interesting research,
which could result from this.
CHAPTER 2
TRUST IN CYBER-SYSTEM
2.1 What is trust?
Trust is undoubtedly an important feature of our everyday lives. We often say "I
trust you" but what does that mean? Does it mean, for example, that I trust you more than
60% of what I consider to be complete trust, or some other arbitrary figure, which means
that my trust in you is greater than some threshold value? Or is it a general statement of
fact, which requires analysis on any action that should be taken? People talked about it
from different points of view: biology, sociology, social psychology, economics, history
and philosophy [Marsh, 1994].
2.1.1 Definition of trust
Trust (or symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents perform a particular
action, both before it can monitor such an action (or independently or his capacity ever to
be able to monitor it) and in a context in which affects his own action [Gambetta, 2000].
For instance, in the case of the Internet relationship, the consumer would believe that a
benevolent vendor, who has promised to provide goods and services in a proper and
convenient way, would do so.
The term "subjective probability" is important in the above definition, because it
points to a certain amount of arbitrariness in the trust metric. Trust is not something that
can be fully obtained using objective measures, but a subjective degree of belief about
others' competence and disposition. That means that a person depends on another person
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with a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible
[McKnight et al, 1998]. An example is the famous prisoners' dilemma [Deutsch, 1958]
[Solomon, I960].
Therefore, when we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we
implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial, or at
least not detrimental to us, is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of
cooperation with him. Correspondingly, when we say that someone is untrustworthy, we
imply that probability is low enough for us to refrain from doing so.
In general, trust supposes a situation of risk, which integrates various views [Marsh,
1994]:
• A means of understanding and adapting to the complexity of the environment
• A means of providing added robustness to independent agents
• A useful judgment in the light of experience of the behavior of others
• Applicable to inanimate others (including artificial agents)
2.1.2 Why trust
Many techniques, such as contracts [Ingersoll, 2000] and signatures [Atreya et al,
2002], have been developed to assume secure and reliable communication between agents,
but they are not yet satisfied. For instance, in the electronic commerce domain trust has
been recognized as one of the key factors for successful electronic commerce adoption. In
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that field, trust is magnified, because agents reach out far beyond their familiar trade
environments and communicate with someone they will never meet.
The concept of trust provides us with an ideal measure of risk since we cannot
assume to know what the behavior of the agent may be at any given time. Therefore, the
notion of trust relies on a judgment based on experience, coupled with past knowledge of
the agent to be trusted and their behavior [Shen et al, 2001].
2.1.3 Kinds of trust
Trust is applied to a range of phenomena, involving objects, processes, and people.
Three general types of trust have been identified [Chandrasekharan, 2002]:
a) Dispositional trust describes an internal state of the trustor, a basic trusting
attitude. This is a sense of basic trust, which is a pervasive attitude towards
oneself and the world [Abdul-Rahman et al, 2000]. Suppose that we asked an
employee if she trusted her newly hired manager, whom she had never before
met, she said that she did trust her, because she always trusts new people until
they gave her some reason not to trust them.
b) Impersonal trust refers to trust on perceived properties or reliance on the
system or institution within which the trust exists. For example, people believe
in the efficiency of a bank to take care of their money because of laws and
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institutions like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that assure
against loss.
c) Interpersonal trust refers to the trust one agent has on another agent directly.
This can be seen as dispositional trust directed towards an animate system. This
trust is agent and context specific. For instance, person A might trust person B in
the context of fixing a furnace, but not for fixing a car. This trust relates to the
behavior of the agent. The behavior is directly caused by trusting intentions and
trusting beliefs of the agent because it tends to translate their beliefs and
intentions into actions, which are influenced by dispositional trust [Nelson and
Cooprider, 1996].
2.1.4 Risk and trust
Risk was broadly defined as an attribute of a decision alternative that reflects the
uncertain and variance of its possible outcomes [Gefen et al, 2003]. From much literature
[Griffiths and Luck, 1999] [Marsh, 1992], risk is said to be intimately related to the amount
of perceived costs and benefits of a situation: the higher the potential costs, the higher is the
risk, with the amount of benefits having a more or less equal effect on risk, so that, in a
simple estimate:
Costs
Risk =
Benefits
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Trust reflects a willingness to assume the risk of a situation and trust can be
represented a function of the degree of these risks [Mayer et al, 1995]. For example, risk in
electronic commercial transactions is primarily created by threats of information security.
2.1.5 Utility and importance
Utility means that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit or to
prevent the happening of risk [Marsh, 1994]. Sometimes, the utility can measure the total
benefit attaching to each of a set of alternative courses of action. While this may well be
feasible in situations with few outcomes, which are known with some certainty, there will
be situations where some outcomes are unknown, or have a probability of unknown
occurrence. An agent can thus rely on, such as a weighing up of the costs and benefits that
it estimates that the situation to hold.
It may seem that the importance and the utility are one in the same, although the
distinction is not obvious. In particular, utility is generally measurable, or at least relatively
straightforward to find an estimate for, whereas importance is a subjective judgment of a
situation on the part of the agent concerned. The agent itself may change, it may receive
specific orders to carry out some actions, which make those actions much more important
at one time than another. In addition, trust cannot be based on rationality alone [Hertzberg,
1988] [Lagenspetz, 1992]. The subjective concept of importance allows something
additional to rationality to be considered. Importance gives the formalism of trust added
prescriptive and descriptive power.
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2.2 What is security?
Security and trust are easily confused. Just as what we talked about above, while
trust is a subjective idea, the security is a technological concept [Pavlou and Ramnath,
2002], which includes encryption technology [Lamsal, 2001], Public-Key Infrastructure
(PKI) technology [He et al, 1998], and so on.
The objective of Information Technology (IT) security is to ensure an
implementation of a system with the security goals.
2.2.1 Security goals
Security goals can be achieved by considering the security requirements of
information technology [Stoneburner, 2001]:
• Availability: assures that the system works properly and the services are available
or not denied to authorized users. It should also ensure that the system is available
to the intended users and for intended use only.
• Integrity: means that the data is free from unauthorized manipulation of data,
which can happen either in storage, during processing or during transmission.
Like data integrity, system integrity means that the system has not been
manipulated or even accessed in an unauthorized manner. To protect data against
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this sort of attack, cryptographic techniques are required, for more details the
section 2.2.2 will develop this aspect.
• Confidentiality: means that only the intended user receives the information and
that the information is not disclosed to any unauthorized individual. The
confidentiality principle applies to data in storage, processing, and in
transmission. One of the methods to realize is RSA algorithm [Lenstra and
Verheul, 1999], we will talk about it in section 2.2.3.
• Accountability: is a requirement that actions of an entity must be traced uniquely
to that entity. It becomes significant for issues like non-repudiation, fault
isolation, intrusion detection and prevention, after-action recovery and legal
action. For example, in the economic commerce, the vendor should be responsible
for his actions.
• Assurance: is required to show that the security measures have been properly
implemented and they work as intended.
2.2.2 Encryption technology
Cryptography helps us to achieve the security goals. Usually, encryption is defined
as the process of translating information from its original form (called plaintext) into an
encoded, incomprehensible form (called ciphertext), in order to ensure privacy and
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authentication of messages and between agents [Diffie and Hellman, 1976] [McKnight et
al, 1998]. A system provides privacy or confidentiality when the message it sends is
exclusively accessible to only the specified receiver, and the sender is assure this will
happen. Similarly, a system provides authentication if the message is exclusively accessible
only to the sender and the receiver is assured this will happen. To illustrate, let us consider
an example. An entity Alice sends a message to another entity Bob through a
communication channel. The communication channel provides privacy or confidentiality if
only Bob can receive the message and Alice knows this fact that only Bob has access to the
message. The system provides authentication if only Alice has access to the message and
Bob knows this fact that it is only Alice who has access and therefore she must have
originated it.
2.2.2.1 Encryption mechanism
The encryption mechanisms are a combination of complex mathematical algorithms
and keys. The process of encryption on the Web is implemented through the use of Web
servers and browsers that are built with this technology referred to as secure socket layer
(SSL) [Mitchell et al, 1998]. A cryptographic system (SK) can be as follows:
SK: {P} -> fQ
This is an invertible transformation from {P} to {C}, where: ? is a space of
plaintext message; C is a space of ciphertext message; K is the key and is selected from a
finite set {K} called keyspace.
17
The key is used to both encrypt and decrypt messages to guarantee privacy and
authentication. Public key cryptography involves a pair of keys for each of the two
communicating parties, one of which is made public and the second one is private to the
entity. The public key is used to encrypt a message and the private key is used to decrypt a
message. For instance, when Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she takes Bob's public
key, which is available in public, encrypts the message with this public key and sends the
encrypted message to Bob. Bob then receives the encrypted message and decrypts it with
his private key. Also, Bob can use Alice's public key to verify a digital signature signed by
Alice using her private key. One of the techniques used to support the encryption is RSA
algorithm.
2.2.3 RSA algorithm
The RSA algorithm was invented in 1978 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman [Lenstra and Verheul, 1999]. Here is the general idea of the encryption algorithm:
1) Find two large prime numbers P and Q (e.g., 1024-bit);
2) Choose E such that E is greater than 1, E is less than P*Q, and E and (P-l) x
(Q-l) are relatively prime, which means they have no prime factors in common.
E does not have to be a prime, but it must be odd. (P-l) x (Q-l) can't be prime
because it's an even number.
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3) Compute D such that (D*E - 1) is evenly divisible by (P-l) x (Q-l).
Mathematicians write this as D*E = 1 (mod (P-l) * (Q-l)), and they call D the
multiplicative inverse ofE. This is easy to do — simply find an integer X which
causes D = (X * (P-l) x (Q-l) + 1)/E to be an integer, then use that value ofD.
4) The encryption function is C = (TAE) mod P*Q, where C is the ciphertext (a
positive integer), T is the plaintext (a positive integer), and A indicates
exponentiation. The message being encrypted, T, must be less than the modulus,
5) The decryption function is T = (CAD) mod P*Q, where C is the ciphertext (a
positive integer), T is the plaintext (a positive integer), and A indicates
exponentiation.
The "public key" is the pair of numbers (PXQ, E). This can be published freely.
Your "private key" is the number D, and must be kept secret. This means that anyone can
encrypt messages to me using my public key, but only I can read them using my private
key.
This works because there is no known way to work out D, P or Q given (PXQ, E),
except to factorize PXQ. If each of P and Q has around 1024 digits, in binary, this
factorization would take billions of years using present-day computers.
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2.2.4 PKI (Public-Key Infrastructure) technology
A big question of public key cryptography is how does an entity trust that the
publicly available key is the genuine key belonging to the other entity it is trying to
communicate with? For instance, how can Alice be perfectly sure that the public key she
obtains from a public domain really belongs to Bob? For this reason it is critical to have a
proper key management system before the public key cryptography can be used securely.
PKI defines a framework for obtaining and trusting a public key of an entity in
order to encrypt information to be decrypted by that entity or in order to verify the digital
signature [Atreya et al, 2002] of that entity.
In order to establish the relationship between the entity and its public key, PKI uses
a data structure called a certificate, which binds the entity's identity with its public key and
also contains information on how to use the public key. The certificate resolves only one
part of the trust issue but the issue that still needs resolving is how to trust a certificate. The
accepted solution within PKI to resolve this issue is to use a trusted entity called a
Certificate Authority (CA) [Lamsal, 2001] to issue the certificates. The CA can digitally
sign a certificate and send it to a requesting entity. This entity, which trusts the CA, can
verify the CA's digital signature. If this verification is successful, the entity can believe that
the certificate it has received is genuine and then can use the public key inside the
certificate. Figure 2.1 illustrates this concept.
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Bob's certificate
Request for
Bob's public
key
Alice's certificate
Request for
Alice's public
key
Figure 2.1 : Basic PKI architecture
Here, both Alice and Bob trust the certificate authority CA. Both of them can
request the CA for each other's public key. CA digitally signs the certificate, which both
Alice and Bob must be able to verify using CA's public key. Once the verification is
successful, they can use the public key inside the certificate to communicate with each
other.
2.3 Related work
The available literature on trust is substantial, considering several people have
worked in this field, and their contributions have been significant. Within our area, the
following work is inspiring.
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2.3.1 Marsh's work
Marsh's work [Marsh, (1992, 1994)] is often referenced because his analysis is
thorough. It suggests that trust includes:
• Basic trust is a disposition to trust. The basic trust of agent x is represented by Tx
Basic trust is not directed to any particular agent or situation, but is a state derived
from past experiences in all situations.
• General trust is not relative to any specific situation a, it simply represents an
interpersonal trust on general trust in another agent. Tx(y) represents the general
trust between agent x and agent y. The estimate of general trust is notated T/y) for
the amount x trusts y and given by the formula 1 :
ae/f
A: is the set of situations that is similar to the present situation a, which x
has experienced with y.
Situational trust is of most importance when considering trust in cooperative
situations. The notation for "x trusts y in situation a" is Tx(y,a) given by the
following formula 2:
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Tx(y,a)= Ux(a) x IJa) x 7>j (2)
Ux(a): is the utility agent x gains from situation a;
Ix(a) : is the importance of situation afar agent x.
In order to estimate situational trust, x will need to consider several aspects
of the situation. It tries to increase utility as far as possible. While this is an
accepted definition of economic rationality, it is felt to lack elements in the decision
to make specifically situational agent-subjective measures. It is for this reason that
Marsh adds a consideration of the importance of the situation to that agent.
For this reason, the agent will decide to cooperate, Marsh suggests an important
formalism of a cooperation threshold which is given by formula 3:
Cooperation ^ Threshold\ (y, a) =
Perceived_Riskx(y, a)
Perceived Competencex (y, a) +Tx(y) •!,(<*) (3)
Where:
The cooperation threshold is considered to be a "subjective measure,
tempered by objective beliefs". Marsh considers different variations of the formula,
including ones where the competence of the trustee is not known in advance.
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The general trust T/y) plays a role in the mediation of the cooperation
threshold: a very low value of this trust will ensure cooperation is less likely to
occur than if it is high.
The Perceived Competence measure is based on experiences in similar
situations, experiences of the same agent in similar situations, and knowledge of
that agent's capabilities in similar situations, evaluated as follows:
Perceived Competencex(y, a) =
-.—7^Experienced_Competence(y, b) x T/y) (4)
Ml'bsB
The Perceived_Risk involves a weighing up of the costs and benefits of the
situation, whether it is worth risking the costs in order to obtain the benefits of the
situation being resolved.
Perceived_Risk (y,a) = C'&' U) * I (a) (5)
B/y,a)
Using the concept of trust to decide whether an agent will work with another agent,
Marsh gives us several possibilities:
• The most intuitive method is to select the most trusted agent to cooperate with,
i.e., if Tx(y) >Tx(z), here z is another agent, then x will choose to cooperate withy.
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• It is possible for x to choose the agent who is trusted more in this situation, taking
the maximum of the situational trust. For different agents, the utility to be gained
from the same situation may be different for the trustor.
• Without taking trust into consideration, x could always decide to cooperate with
the agent whose cooperation threshold was the lowest.
• x may choose to cooperate with the agent who has the largest gap between
cooperation threshold and situational trust, as if:
T/y, a) - Cooperation Threshold\ (y, a) >
TJz, a) - Cooperation Thresholdx (z, a) (6)
For all of these choice methods, agent x's final consideration may be to take all of
these choice methods, and choose to cooperate with the agent who 'wins' the most.
Marsh's work is interesting in the sense that it demonstrates the computational
aspect of the trust but it has some limitations:
• It considers the trustee to be a passive entity. However, in the real world, the
trustee is either positive or negative.
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• The role of the environment is not captured, though trust is considered as
"situated". A situation is considered as something like a "box" or a "framework"
within which the trusting decision is made. However, in the real world, a situation
is not a slice of time and space, but a broader intermingling of contexts.
• Trust is closely connected to reputation and social institutions. The role of these
institutions is assumed, particularly in the Perceived_Competence variable, but
the roles are not captured formally by the model.
• The crucial role played by communication in trust is not captured.
• Trust is considered to be a distinguishable and independent state of mind.
However, there is a set of mental states (like beliefs) that contribute to trust
[Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998a].
2.3.2 The work of Castelfranchi and Falcone
The work of Castelfranchi and Falcone [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998a] is more
cognitively oriented. It considers trust to be a "cluster" mental state, which consists of:
• Competence belief: an agent x should believe that an agent y can do action a. In
other word, a positive evaluation of y is necessary, x should believe that y is useful
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for this goal of its, that y can produce/provide the expected result, that y can play
such a role in x's plan/action, that y has some function.
> Disposition belief: x should believe that y is willing to do a. With cognitive
agents this will be a belief relative to their willingness, this makes them
predictable [Miceli etal., 1995].
• Dependence belief: x believes it must rely on y (strong dependence) or x believes
it is good to rely on>> (weak dependence).
• Fulfillment belief: x believes that goal g will be achieved (thanks to y in this
case).
• Willingness belief: x has to believe that j> has decided and intends to do action a.
1
 Persistence belief: x believes thatj> is stable in his intentions, and will persist with
a.
Self- confidence belief: x believes that y knows that^ can do a.
Motivation Belief: x believes that >> has some motives to help it.
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The authors consider the action/goal pair r = (a, g) as the real object of cooperation,
and they calls it "task". Then by means of r, the author will refer to the action (a), to its
resulting world state (g), or to both. Thus, the authors simplify and formalize social trust
based on mental state of the agent as follows:
Trust (x, y, r) = Goalx r A BxPracPossy(a, g) A
BxPreferx(Doney(a, g), Doneja, g)) A
(Bx(Intendy(a, g) A Persisty(a, g)) A
(Goalx (Intendy (a, g), Persisty (a, g)))
Where:
PracPossy(a, g) =g A Abilityy (a)
Goalx T : the goal of agent x is to do task r
BxPracPossy(a, g) : agent x believes y has the same goal and y has the
ability to do task r
BxPreferx(Doriey(a, g), Doneja, g)) : agent x will compare who is the
best to do it.
Bx(Intendy(a, g) A Persisty(a, g) : agent x believes y has intentions and y
will do it for a long time
Goalx (Intendy (a, g), Persisty (a, g)J : the goal of agent y intentions and y
will do it for a long time.
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Therefore, the degree of trust is based on the "strength" of its component beliefs.
The notion of the degree of trust of x in y about T is DoTxyr (0 < 7^ r < 1) and is given by
the following formulas:
DoTxyT = DoCx [Oppy(a, g)J * DoCx [Abilityy(a)] x DoCx [WillDoy(a, g)J (1)
Where:
DoCx [Opp (a, g)J , is the degree of credibility of x's beliefs about y's
opportunity of performing a to realize g;
DoCx [Abilityy(a)] , is the degree of credibility of x's beliefs about >>'s
ability/competence to perform a;
DoCx [WillDo (a, g)J , the degree of credibility of x's beliefs about y's
actual perform;
Where, DoCx [WillDoy(a, g)] is defined as follows:
DoCx [WillDo/a, g)J =DoCx [Intend'/a, g)J *
DoCx [Persisty (a, g)J (2)
Where, Intendy (a, g) : means that y intends to do a in order to achieve g
Persistv(a, g) : means thatjy persists to do a in order to achieve g
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The decision to trust is based on this rule:
Tx(y, a) > Cooperation Thresholdx (y, a) => Will Delegation (x, y, a) (3)
Here the authors talk about the concept of delegation, which is a decision of
transferring the realization of the task. We will discuss "delegation" in more detail in
Chapter 3.
This work has some limitations. One of the problems is the broad scope of the
competence belief. For instance, it is not clear why a "fulfillment belief is needed. The
other problem is this work proposes very complex formulas, which are difficult to compute
in some domains. Also, as Marsh's work, it depends on the modeling of the trustee's
mental state to get to a trust metric, focuses on the internal state of the trustor and ignores
communication, which is a crucial component of any trusting decision.
2.3.3 Pavlou's work
We are interested in Pavlou's work [Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002] because of his
contribution to the definition of security and the method on how to combine security and
trust.
In this work, security is defined as the subjective probability with which consumers
believe that their personal information will not be viewed, stored or manipulated during
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transit or storage by inappropriate parties. As a recent phenomenon, the Internet customer
perceptions of information security have been influenced by certain factors such as
encryption, authentication, protection and verification. In these factors, the concept of
verification is hard to define. It means the most important difference between electronic and
traditional transactions is the lack of implicit identity verification associated with the
transaction. In some domains, it is not only easy for someone to create a phony web page,
but it is also equally possible for a malicious operator to create an entirely spurious web
site. All consumers need to know that Citibank is housed at "www.citibank.com" and not at
"www.citibank.net" or even that Citibank is spelt with an "z" and not a " / ' as in Citybank?
Pavlou gives the hypothesis formula of Security as follows:
Security = ao + aiEncryption + a.2 Protection + 0.3 Verification + a.4
Authentication
He also ran an investigation based on regression analysis to obtain the values of the
coefficients a, (a, =0, 1). An empirical study with 179 participants was performed. The
participants were asked to assess the degree of perceived security with which they have
little experience. The analysis indicates that the effect of encryption, protection and
authentication on the perceived security were significant; while verification had an
influence it was non-significant. Thus he obtained the formula as follows:
Security - 0.19Encryption + 0.29Protection + 0.11 Verification +
0.16Authentication
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Also, Pavlou advances the concept of trust as follows:
Trust = Po+ Pi Security + f$2 liability + fa Reputation
Where:
Financial liability: Assuming that consumers are mostly concerned with the
monetary aspect of electronic commercial (EC) transactions. There may be a
reason why credit cards are the most common means for financial
instruments in EC transactions. For instance, now Visa (www.visa.com)
offers zero liability on such transactions, thus completely removing
monetary risks from consumers.
Reputation: The proposed definition of trust in EC transactions is essentially
twofold; trust in Internet retailers and also trust in the security of the
underlying medium. To show that perceived security indeed engenders trust
in EC transactions, the author controls for the effect of store reputation in
EC transactions.
The complete conceptual framework is shown in Figure 2.2.
Pavlou used the same method, ran an investigation and used least-squares
regression analysis to analyze data and to obtain these results: the effect of perceived
security and reputation on trust was significant; in contrast, the effect of financial liability
on trust was non-significant. Therefore the author gets:
Trust = 0.5 3 Security + 0.07Liability + 0.20Reputation
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Figure 2.2 : Conceptual framework
In his work, Pavlou proposes a set of antecedents to perceived security from
technological mechanisms that are visible and therefore perceptible to the consumer. Also,
he proposes a subjective approach to combine a trust and security. However, this approach
is limited to Electronic-commerce domain, for example, some customers do not choose the
Internet retailers, because they are in different fields, although they believe in the Internet
retailers' security. For the trust between agents, the security is not the only important factor.
For instant, an agent wants to cooperate with other agents, at first, what it wants to know
are not their intentions but their security. He also suggests the subjective attitude of the
method, but he does not discuss the manner to obtain the estimation of reputation and those
variables in the formula of security.
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2.3.4 Chandrasekharan's work
The model of trust proposed by Chandrasekharan [Chandrasekharan, 2002] is based
on communication, which is a crucial component of any trusting decision. When an agent is
faced with a situation that it cannot compare with an internal structure on which to base a
decision, the agent has to do a large amount of querying or communication with the world,
and use that information to make a decision.
Chandrasekharan believes that this representational querying process is
fundamentally the understanding of the trust problem. Human beings have the following
unique capacity: they can have one internal state, and express a very different one. In other
words, the internal state and its representation need not be directly correlated. It is called a
gap between the representations and the internal states. Then, the aim of this work is; inter-
agent trust involves making sure that there is no representational gap. That is, making sure
that the external expressions of people correlate with their postulated internal states.
However, if human being's language and behavior were a direct one-to-one
correspondence between internal state and external expression, human beings do not have
to run elaborate inference procedures to trust people. For example, the dog language and
behavior is like a protocol, where the expressions have specific and particular meanings.
For systems that work using protocols, there is no need for extensive querying or trust
calculation. All we need to do is to compare representational patterns. For trust situations
involving agents with such a link between internal structure and external representation, the
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calculation of the trust metric is essentially a process of verifying the extent of the link
between an agent's external expressions and its internal state, using queries.
Then, Chandrasekharan considers the Distributed Cognition (DC) model is a good
method to deal with the problem of the gap between the representations and the internal
states. DC model considers intelligence to be spread out among other agents and functional
contexts, and it emphasizes both representations and the role of the environment. Cognitive
processes are considered as distributed across the members of a social group, and the
functioning of the cognitive system involves coordination between internal and external
structure. Processes are also distributed over time; so earlier events can influence later
events.
The distributed cognition approach assumes that cognitive systems consisting of
more than one individual have different cognitive properties from the cognitive properties
of individuals that participate in such systems. If the task is collaborative, as in most trust
situations, individuals working together will possess different kinds of knowledge. The
individuals will therefore engage in interactions that will allow them to pool the various
resources to accomplish the task. Since the knowledge is shared by the participants,
communicative practices that exploit this shared knowledge can be used, like having a
shared information structure such as a speed bug in a cockpit [Hutchins, 1995].
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This instance of an extended mind and the focus on both internal and external
representational structures makes distributed cognition an ideal framework to explore the
trust problem. This is because the environment involved in an inter-agent trust decision is
one of representations, and more than one agent and (possibly) artifacts is involved. Also,
as Khare and Rifkin [Khare and Rifkin, 1997] point out, any trust decision involving
artificial agents bottoms out to a trust decision involving humans. So the problem-space of
trust is a distributed socio-technical system, consisting of people and artifacts (agents).
The author suggests an agent design framework, inspired by a distributed cognition,
as illustrated in figure 2.3. In the first two cases the environment is considered as a given,
and the designer makes no changes to the environment. This is passive design. In the third
case, the designer actively intervenes in the environment and gives structure to it, so that
the agent can function better in it. The agent only needs to query for the structure provided
by the designer. This is active design, where the knowledge is split equally between the
agent and the environment. The agent and the environment evolve together. In the fourth
case, it is the environment that is designed, and the agent is assumed to have minimal
capabilities.
Chandrasekharan applies the DC model to agent systems to suggest a programming
language that can act as an institution to partially solve the trust problem. Because he tries
to create an institutional structure, which guarantees that the representations generated to
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Figure 2.3 : Agent design
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accurately reflect the internal state of an agent. In agent systems, this means creating Agent
Communication Languages (ACLs) that reflect accurately the internal state of the agent.
For this, Chandrasekharan hopes to combine the ACL with the programming language used
to build the agent. This is true of interface agents as well. A human will trust an interface
agent only if the agent provides the user with ways to reduce the representational gap,
either by induction through extensive interaction, or through secondary sources like experts
and reviews, or by being able to know, and change, the internal. This method is against the
spirit of the agent paradigm, because the paradigm seeks to allow any agent, created using
any language, to work with each other.
The DC approach has quite a few problems associated with the language. The major
one being the restrictions the language places on the roles of agents. For instance, the
notion of an agent being called a "free - agent", which can do any task that comes up, is
sacrificed. Another problem is that the approach is not easily applicable to learning agents.
This is because learning involves change of competence, and hence a change of roles. Thus,
learning would result in the agent having a different competence to communicate.
Therefore, the production language will have to allow for changes to be made to the claims.
Changes in claims will weaken the guarantee provided by the language and bring up the
trust problem again.
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2.3.5 The work of Griffiths and Luck
The trust's model proposed by Griffiths [Griffiths and Luck, 1999] is based on an
extension of BDI model (for more details see Chapter 3) by introducing the concept of trust
in planning decisions.
The authors define a plan of making decision as sequence of steps, where a step
either is an individual action, a joint action, a set of concurrent actions, or a sub-goal. Their
aim is to choose the best plan - the plan that is most likely to be successful, with least cost
in terms of time and resources, and the least risk. Therefore, they identify four primary
factors relevant in comparing plans in respect of risk:
• Agent Capabilities: Knowledge of others' capabilities helps to determine which
agents might perform the required actions.
• Risk from Others: Once potential cooperating agents are identified, they may be
evaluated in terms of the risk involved in interacting with them. Plans involving
interaction more likely to be successful should be rated higher than those
involving interactions less likely to be successful.
• Risk from view of self: Knowledge of the view of oneself in the eyes of others in
terms of risk of interaction may also be useful in assessing plans. It can provide a
measure of the likelihood that another agent will agree to cooperate, since an
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agent is more likely to cooperate with another if it has confidence in the success
of that interaction.
• Agent Preferences: It might also be possible to assess plans in relation to the
higher-level motivations of the agents involved in them, and whether cooperation
would be likely.
In the problem of plan-selection, trust is a main factor. As recognized by several
researchers [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998a] [Deutsch, 1962] [Gambetta, 2000] [Luhmann,
1990] [Marsh, 1994], trust implies some form of risk, and that entering into a trusting
relationship is choosing to take an uncertain path that can lead to either benefit or cost
depending on the behavior of others. The authors suggest an inverse relationship between
trust, T, and risk, R, as follows:
R (i)
In assessing the merit of a plan, an agent must make a judgment about the risk
attached to each action in the plan requiring cooperation, by examining the trust value in its
model of each of the possible cooperating agents. Suppose that an agent knows of n others,
xr, X2\ ; xn, with the required capabilities for performing a given action, and ordered
such that TY > TY , where Tr denotes the trust in agent xn. Then, the agent would first try
to cooperate with xi and, if unsuccessful, would then try X2, and so on, but for each
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successive agent, the likelihood of success decreases. To address this, authors give the
formula as follows:
^action = ~ JT~ (2)
denotes the risk of the action.
Trust in all relevant agents is considered in relation to the likelihood of cooperation
with them. Using this measure of risk, the author can determine the cooperative rating of a
plan by summing the risk associated with each action in it. Thus a plan with few high-risk
actions may be rated better (or less risky) than a plan with many low risk actions. For a plan
with m actions, ar, a?, ; am, the cooperative rating C for that plan is given by the
following equation.
Because of an inverse relationship between trust and risk, in fact, the authors give
us the relationship between trust and cooperation:
m
(4)
i=7
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In this work, the authors think the limitation of BDI architecture is that it is
typically focused on execution for individual agents. Then they extend a BDI-like
architecture to include those higher-level control strategies. However, several questions are
described: firstly, the authors consider how to incorporate the notion of an agent's rights to
perform actions, not only when in terms of an agent not having the right to perform an
action and so needing to cooperate, and also when assessing the risk involved in a plan in
relation to the rights of other. Secondly, as Marsh [Marsh, 1994] points out, an agent's trust
in another is dependent on the action being considered. This would provide a richer basis
for plan selection if incorporated into the assessment of plans, but at a cost of increasing the
overhead of modeling others.
2.3.6 The work of Gefen, Srinivasan and Tractinsky
In recent years, there are some troublesome trends about trust and risk [Mayer et al.,
1995]. This confusion in the relationship between risk and trust is expressed as follows: it is
unclear whether risk is an antecedent to trust, or an outcome of trust. Gefen [Gefen et al,
2003] offers the relationship between trust and risk, they discuss the concepts of trust and
risk.
• Concept of trust
Comparing with several studies, such as the distinction between trusting
beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behavior, and the distinction between initial and
ongoing trust, the authors will limit the discussions of trust to a discussion of the
need for distinction between trust and trustworthiness.
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Mayer [Mayer et al, 1995] indicated that perceived trustworthiness is the
trustor's perception of how trustworthy the trustee is, while trust, is the trustor's
willingness to engage in a risky behavior that stems from the trustor's vulnerability
to the trustee's behavior. Trustworthiness is a characteristic of the trustee, and may
stem from several perceptions of the trustor about the trustee. For example, some
people say "I believe that Amazon.com is trustworthy". According to Mayer et al,
the perceptions of the trustor, that affect his/her perception of the trustee, are the
trustee's ability, integrity and benevolence. Trust on the other hand refers to the
trustor's intentions or behavior with respect to the transaction.
• Concept of risk
Risk was broadly defined as an attribute of a decision alternative that
reflects the variance of its possible outcomes. The more recent terminology is
originated in the fields of risk assessment and risk management, which relate risk
with the costs of those outcomes. Managers tend to define risk more by the
magnitude of the value of the outcome, rather than by taking its likelihood into
account. This may be because risk is present in a situation where the possible
damage may be greater than the advantage that is sought [Luhmann, 1990]. Now
let's look at the three models about the relationship between trust and risk:
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a) Mediating relationship: It argues that the existence of trust reduces the
perception of risk, which in turn increases the willingness to engage in a
transaction. In other word, trust affects perceived risk, which affects behavior
[Jarvenpaa et al, (1999, 2000)], as shown by the following figure:
Trust I H Perceived Risk Behavior
Figure 2.4 : Mediating relationship
For example the perceived risk of lending money to a trusted friend will be
lower than that of lending money to a stranger. This work goes on to add that trust
is one of the key factors for reducing the perceived risk of a negative outcome in a
given situation. Thus, among ecommerce researchers, there appears to be an
overwhelming subscription to the mediating role of risk in the relationship between
trust and behavior.
b) Moderating relationship: It is believed that the effect of trust on behavior is
different when the level of risk is low versus when the level of risk is high as
shown by the following figure:
The primary belief is that when risk is high, trust is relevant; when risk is low,
trust is not relevant. This means that perceived risk moderates the relations
between behavior and trust. It demonstrates the moderating effect of risk on the
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Trust
Perceived Risk
r
Behavior
Figure 2.5 : Moderating relationship
trust-behavior relationship in an experimental study, in which subject trade with
each other under conditions of high risk and low risk. This shows that trust between
trading partners is higher in the high-risk condition than trust between trading
partners in the low-risk condition.
c) Threshold model: It assumes that trust is formed independent of risk
perceptions. If the level of trust surpasses the threshold of perceived risk, then the
trustor will engage in a risk taking relationship. Our work is connected with these
cases. For example, lending money is a risky action that requires the lender to
trust the receiver. For a given level of trust, less risk (e.g., smaller amount of
money) would increase the tendency to lend.
The primary goal of this work is to alert researchers in e-commerce that we are in
imminent danger of expending a great deal of effort to produce a chaotic mess of empirical
evidence, without the means to integrate all the evidence to get a defensible view of the role
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of risk and trust in e-commerce. However the authors only give theoretical advice, but do
not provide us with a practical method to deal with these questions.
2.4 Conclusion
In cyber-systems, trust is an important concept. In this chapter, we mainly talked
about the definition of trust. Though it is hard to accurately define it, we can come to a
conclusion that trust is a subjective project and not something that can be fully obtained
using objective measures. Therefore, through analysis of the kinds of trust and the
relationships between trust and risk, we found it is a subjective degree of belief about
others' competence and disposition. We also hope to measure the probability of
cooperation, so we raise some concepts, such as risk, utility, importance, benefit, cost, and
so on, to reach our goal. Using them, we obtain some formulas, or formalism, of trust from
different researchers. These formalisms are of unquestionable worth for the understanding
of the trust's concept. To date, discussions of trust have suffered from vagueness and the
lack of an agreed definition. Thus these formalisms present a means of establishing a clear,
precise, and easily understood language for that discussion.
Another confusion is the relationship between trust and security. The reason to talk
about trust is to ensure the security of communication. Thus, we discussed security from
abstract definitions to quantifiable formulas. In fact, security is more technological. It
includes: encryption, protection, verification and authentication. Moreover, according to
Pavlou and Ramnath [Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002], security is one of those factors that
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influence trust and the effect of perceived security on trust is significant. Therefore, we
think these two definitions are different yet also interactive.
In our area, we study the trust between agents. Therefore we are more concerned
with trust in social trust and cognitive agents' trust. We introduce a typology conceptual
definition of cognitive agents' trust and the conjunction with each trust type.
At the end of this chapter, we presented the view of trust of several researchers
whose work has greatly inspired us. Marsh's work is thorough. Not only did he give us the
definition and formula of trust and the degree of trust, but he also raises his method about
how to judge cooperation. The work of Castelfranchi and Falcone is more cognitively
oriented. It considers the role of beliefs and makes the basic assumption that only an agent
with goals and beliefs can trust. As well as Marsh's work, the work of Castelfranchi and
Falcone will become the basis of our work. Compared with Marsh and Castelfranchi,
Pavlou talks about the relationship between trust and security. He gives us some details
about security to show it is a technological conception. Pavlou offers a useful method to
test his hypothesis. This method will also be helpful for our work. Chandrasekharan thinks
the trust models of Marsh and Castelfranchi ignore a crucial role in trust, the
communication, so he tries to find a better model of trust. He introduces the concept of
representation and the distributed cognition model to suggest a programming language that
can act as an institution to partially solve the trust problem; Griffiths and Luck discuss and
extend BDI agent architectures. In order to choose the best plan, they try to measure the
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trust using the degree of risk. They raise the inverse relationship between trust and risk and
give their formula. The primary goal of the work of Gefen et al. is to alert researchers that
we are in imminent danger if we cannot integrate all the evidence to get a defensible view
of the role of risk and trust in ecommerce. For this reason, the authors address three
important areas: the distinction between trust and trustworthiness, the conceptualization of
risk, and the relationships between risk as well as trust and behavior, and give
conceptualizations and models in this area.
CHAPTER 3
AGENT'S PARADIGM
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3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, we introduced trust. Trust is a multi-dimension concept and concerns
many different attributes such as reliability, dependability, security, honesty, competence,
etc, which may have to be addressed based upon the environment where it is specified
[Grandison and Sloman, 2000]. However, we are concerned with how the concept of trust
can be used in relation to cooperation between artificial agents. In this chapter, we will
introduce the common knowledge about agents system and specially will discuss BDI
model [Rao and Georgeff, 1992] that can help us to understand the chapter below and how
to realize trust in agents.
The evolution of artificial intelligence systems has quickly developped over recent
years. More and more, we are becoming interested not only in the creation of intelligent
systems, but also with the concepts of autonomy, mobility, representation of knowledge,
distributed problem resolution, communication, etc. In order to answer these problems,
over the past few years, the community working in the field of distributed artificial
intelligence [Jennings, 1993] [Ferber, 1995] [Tambe, 1997] [Grosz and Kraus, 1998]
[Wooldridge, 2000] has been trying to elaborate theories on the concepts of agent and
multi-agent system.
3.1.1 Agent's notion
For the last twenty-five years, the community working in the field of artificial
intelligence for distributed systems has tried to formally define the concept of the agent. So
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far, there is no general consensus standard that has been obtained. However, we can note
that certain definitions are usually used in literatures. In particular, the case of the definition
of Wooldridge and Jennings [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995], which is one of the most
recognized and has been adopted in this research project. According to them, an agent can
be defined as being a software entity (virtual, data-processing module) or material (robot),
which can support the four following properties:
• Autonomy: this property defines that an agent has to function without the direct
intervention of a human operator or other entity. It also defines that this agent will
have a certain control on its actions and internal state.
• Social Skills: this property defines that an agent will have to interact with other
agents (or possibly humans) via a communication language. A famous example in
the used languages is KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language),
which is a high level protocol based on the acts of language [Finin et al., 1994].
• Reaction: this property states that an agent will have to perceive its environment
and react according to the changes produced by the environment.
• Pro-action: this property states that an agent will not only be able to act according
to what occurs in its environment, but also to act and take initiatives according to
the goals it wishes to reach.
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In a more formal way, we can define an agent A in a minimal manner by the
following triplet:
A = <I,OP,MS>
Z : represents the set of the possible states of the environnement in
which agent A moves
Op : represents the set of operations able to be carried out by A
MS : represents the set of the possible configurations for the mental states
of agent A
In a general manner, we can then see an agent A as being defined fonction/* as the
following:
fA : I x MS -> Op
The agents are able to take action and not only to reason as in traditional systems.
The action, which is a fundamental concept for the multi-agent systems, rests on the fact
that the agents achieve actions, which will modify their environments, including their
mental states.
3.1.2 Multi-Agent System (MAS)
A multi-agent system, such as illustrated in figure 3.1, is composed of the following
elements [Ferber, 1995]:
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Représentations
Actions
Communications
Perceptions
Environment £—3 Environment's objects
Figure 3.1 : A multi-agent system representation according to Ferber [Ferber, 1995]
a) Environment E, meaning a metric space generally layed out.
b) A unit of objects 0. These objects are placed, meaning that for any object, it is
possible, at any given time, to assign a position in E. These objects are passive,
meaning it can be perceived, created, destroyed and modified by the agents.
c) A unit of agents A, particular objects {A ŒO), represent the active entities of the
system.
d) The overall relations R link objects (and thus agents) between them.
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e) A unit of operations Op allows agents A to perceive, produce, consume, transform
and handle objects O.
f) An operators unit allows to carry out various operations Op and to produce world
reactions to these operations. This is what we call the laws of the universe.
There are certain particular system cases where A = O and E = 0. In this case,
relations R define a network: each agent is directly dependent on a unit of other agents.
These systems, called purely communicating MAS, are very often used in the field of
distributed artificial intelligence. Their field of predilection is the cooperation of software
modules whose function is to solve a problem or elaborate on an expertise (such as the
interpretation of signals), starting with specialized modules, as in the case of distributed
system control, where E is defined by the structure of the subjacent network. These systems
are characterized by the fact that the interactions are primarily intentional communications
and that their working method resembles social welfare (working group, company,
administration, etc).
3.1.3 Software agent
For Brenner [Brenner et al, 1998] three categories of agents can be distinguished:
human agents, hardware agents and software agents. Intelligent software agents are defined
as being a software program that can perform specific tasks for a user and possess a degree
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of intelligence that permits it to perform parts of its tasks autonomously and to interact with
its environment in a useful manner.
3.1.4 Mobile agent
Mobile agents are software agents that are capable of moving from one machine to
another automatically. One advantage compared to a static agent residing on a particular
machine is that this can decrease the network communication load. Indeed, if we suppose to
consider an agent involved in e-commerce trying to buy videos on specific topics, then the
agent will first have to select which sites to visit, then for each interesting site it will
request samples of videos in order to select those of interest. After having repeated the
process for a number of sites, it will be able to place an order.
3.1.5 Interface agent
Interface agents facilitate the interaction between a user and a computer system.
They are intended to improve interaction, such as accessing information, assisting with
current work, learning, or just providing entertainment [Maes, 1997]. The kind of the agent
already developed range from easy-to-program simple services for users [Malone et al,
1997] to quite complex reasoning assistants [Ball et al, 1997]. A major problem with
interface agents is their acceptance by users. They should ideally behave like English builds
[Negroponte, 1997] knowing their master's or mistress's preferences and offering services
in a tactful fashion. To be able to do so, however, they require a sophisticated model of
their owner, and need to be able to acquire and maintain such a model.
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3.1.6 Reactive agent
In the mid eighties, Minsky introduced the concept of the Society of Mind [Minsky,
1985], a scheme in which each mind is made of smaller processes. These we shall call
agents. Each mental agent by itself can only do simple things that need no mind or thought
at all. Yet, when we join these agents in societies - in certain ways this leads to true
intelligence. Along the same line, Brooks [Brooks, 1990] argued against founding artificial
intelligence upon complex symbol systems, which are too difficult to construct and to
manipulate. He offers, on the contrary, a new methodology bases its decomposition of
intelligence into individual behavior generating module, whose coexistence and
cooperation let more complex behavior emerge. Brooks demonstrated the approach by
building mobile robots as interconnected simple modules involving sensors reacting to
external conditions and driving actuators.
3.1.7 Cognitive agent
In contrast to the reactive agents described above, cognitive agents possess an
explicit knowledge of their environment. The heritage off cognitive agents is clearly
artificial intelligence. They use sophisticated knowledge representations, have expertise,
goals, and plans, and so on. In addition to their traditional mechanisms they must interact
and engage in cooperation with other agents. Many types of cognitive agents have been
proposed. One of the best known agent architectures for reasoning agents is the belief-
desire-intention (BDI) model [Rao and Georgeff, 1992].
56
3.2 BDI Model
The BDI model considers an agent as a human being, has a certain state spirit, a
point of view on a situation. This mental state can be defined as the dynamic configuration
of an agent's internal state in one moment. It consists of information coming from
perceptions of the environment, so called the percepts, of the objectives of the agent, of the
beliefs of the agent compared to the percepts and of its intentions. The model is a reference
of the mental state of the agent, which has a number of applications ranging from air traffic
control, telephone call centers to the handling of malfunctions on NASA's Space Shuttle
[Busetta and Ramamohanarao, 1998].
3.2.1 Belief
The beliefs are the result of the perceived information of the environment and the
knowledge infered by an agent starting from the information. The figure 3.2.a shows the
representation of the agent's beliefs. An agent A could obtain a knowledge Pi of an
existence state sj, coming from a perception PerceptA(si)1. Then, it could infer a knowledge
P2, by conducting a PredictionA(PI, R, C)2, to leave of a series of rules of an inference R
and current beliefs C, which would be showed as follows:
((Pi = PerceptA(s 1)) A (P2 = PredictionA(P}, R, C))) => (BelA Pi A BelA P2)
PerceptA(si), is an opertator (method) of perception indicating that agents perceives a situation s.
PredictionA (Pi, R, C), is an operator (method) of forecast indicating that agent A envisages a future situation
to leave the knowledge P, according to a certain number of rules R and according to its current beliefs C.
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Figure 3.2 : BDI state
3.2.2 Desire
The desires or the goals of an agent constitute its motivation to act [Wooldridge and
Jennings, 1995]. These goals are represented by a series of states, which the agent wishes to
reach, such as shown in figure 3.2.b. Certains goals can be established during the creation
of the agent. Suppose that an ore extracting robot could have the basic objective to bring
back ore. Other desires can be starting from the beliefs of the agent, for example a robot
extractor believes the fuel lack, it could infer a new consistent objective.
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3.2.3 Intention
The intentions of an agent represent the actions that one intends to carry out in the
future so that it will reach some or all its objectives (desires). Figure 3.2.c shows a
representation of the intentions of an agent A at time t+1. In fact, these constituted
intentions are starting from the beliefs and the goals of the agent's plan. Suppose that a
robot extractor, which aims to bring back ore, could start to dig the rock in 10 minutes, if it
believes that it will arrive close to the layer only in 10 minutes.
3.2.4 State
Figure 3.2 clearly illustrates the operation of the BDI model. We can see there is
one moment t where agent A believes in a current state sj of the environment. It also
believes that it is possible to carry out the actions ai, a2 and a3 with the instant t+1 thus
allowing to respectively reach states s/, s2, S3. We can see that agent A aims to reach state .s^
and so beforehand it is necessary for him to reach state S2- Finally, we see that the
intentions of agent A with the moment Tare to reach the action ai with the instant t+1 so as
to reach state S2, and then to carry out the action a4 with the instant t+2, which will allow it
to reach its goal, state s4.
3.2.5 BDI Architecture
A representative BDI architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.3. As this figure shows,
the BDI architecture typically contains four key data structures [Wooldridge, 1996]: beliefs,
desires, intentions and plan library. A plan library is a set of plans, which specify courses of
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action that may be followed by an agent in order to achieve its intentions. A data input from
sensors agent's plan library represents its procedural knowledge, or know-how. A plan
contains two parts: a body, or program, which defines a course of action; and a descriptor,
which states both the circumstances under which the plan can be used (i.e., its pre-
condition), and what intentions the plan may be used in order to achieve (i.e., its post-
condition).
In Figure 3.3, we can see the agent reacts to events, which are generated by
modifications to its beliefs, additions of new goals or messages arriving from the external
world. An event may invoke (trigger) one or more plans; the agent then commits to execute
one or more of them, that is, they become intentions. This desire is then used as a trigger
for a corresponding plan from a plan library. Intentions are executed one step at the time. A
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Figure 3.3 : BDI architecture
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step can query or change the beliefs, perform actions on the external world, suspend the
execution until a certain condition is met, and submit new goals.
The operations performed by a step may generate new events, which, in turn, may
start new intentions. An intention succeeds when all its steps have been completed; it fails
when certain conditions (either guarding its execution or being tested by a step) are not
met, or actions being performed report errors, etc. An agent applies a set of default policies
when selecting which plans become intentions, how to schedule the active intentions, etc.
These can be overridden by policies defined by the user, usually invoked via the same
event/plan/ intention mechanism described above.
Also, we can use an interpreter loop, as follows, is given below [Rao and Georgeff,
1995]. They assume that the event queue, belief, desire, and intention structures are global.
BDI-interpreter
initializestateQ;
repeat
options := option-generator (event-queue);
selected-options := deliberate(options);
update-intentions (selected-options);
executeQ;
get-new-external-events();
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drop-successful-attitudes();
drop-impossible-attitudes();
end repeat
At the beginning of every cycle, the option generator reads the event queue and
returns a list of options. Next, the deliberator selects a subset of options to be adopted and
adds these to the intention structure. If there is an intention to perform an atomic action at
this point in time, the agent then executes it. Any external events that have occurred during
the interpreter cycle are then added to the event queue. Internal events are added as they
occur. Next, the agent modifies the intention and desire structures by dropping all
successful desires and satisfied intentions, as well as impossible desires and unrealizable
intentions.
This abstract architecture is an idealization, including the various components of
practical reasoning [Bratman, 1987]; namely, option generation, deliberation, execution,
and intention handling. However, it is not a practical system for rational reasoning.
3.2.6 BDI Semantic
In order to give formal semantics to BDI architectures, a range of BDI logics have
been developed by Rao and Georgeff [Wooldridge, 1996]. Most work on BDI logics has
focused on possible relationships between the three "mental states" [Rao and Georgeff,
1991], and more recently, on developing proof methods for restricted forms of the logics
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[Rao and Georgeff, 1995]. The traditional possible semantics worlds [Halpern and Moses,
1985] of beliefs consider each world w to be a collection of propositions and models belief
by a belief-accessibility relation B linking these worlds [Rao and George, 1991]. A formula
is believed in a world if and only if it is true in all its belief-accessible worlds.
We can consider each possible world to be a time tree. Each time tree denotes the
optional courses of events chosen by an agent in a particular world. The belief relation
maps a possible world at a time point to other possible worlds. We say that an agent has a
belief ^, denoted Bel(</>), at time point t if and only if </> is true in all the belief-accessible
worlds of the agent at time t. The semantics for belief can be defined formally as follows:
M, v, w, | =Bel(0) iffVw' eBwtM,v,wt'\=0
M : is an interpretation,
V : is a variable assignment
W : is the world, wt' is a sub-world of the world
Bw( : is the Belief at the time t in the world w
As the belief relation is time-dependent, the mapping of B at some other time point,
say t2, may be different from the one at ti. Thus the agent can change its beliefs according
to the available options.
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The semantic of the modal operator goal is given in terms of a goal-accessible
relation G, which is similar to that of the B relation. The goal-accessibility relation specifies
situations that the agent desires to be in. Thus, in the same way that we treat belief, we say
that the agent has a goal <j) at time t if and only if </> is true in all the goal-accessible worlds
of the agent at time t. The semantic for goal can be defined formally as follows:
M, v, w, | =Goal(0) iffVw'eGwtM,v,wt'\=0
Gwt : is the Goal at the time t in the world w
One can view intentions as future paths that the agent chooses to follow. The
intention-accessibility relation /will be used to map the agent's current situation to all her
intention-accessible worlds. We shall say that the agent intends a formula at a certain time
if and only if it is true in all the agent's intention-accessible worlds of that time.
We saw above that the goal-accessible worlds of the agent can be viewed as the
sub-worlds of the belief-accessible worlds in which the agent desires to be. Similarly, one
can view intention-accessible worlds as sub-worlds of the goal-accessible worlds that the
agent chooses to follow (i.e., to act upon). Thus, one moves from a belief-accessible world
to a goal-accessible world by desiring future paths, and from a goal-accessible world to an
intention-accessible world by committing to certain desired future paths. The semantics for
intention can be defined formally as follows:
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M, v, w, | =lntend(0) iff Vw' <= T, M,v,wt'\= 0
F, : is the Intention at the time t in the world w
We allow intentions over any well-formed formula, which means that agent can
have intentions about intentions, intentions about goals, intentions about beliefs, and
intentions to do certain actions. Some one might consider only the last type of intention to
correspond with natural usage. While this is arguable, in our formalism the agent might
have any type of intention but will only act on the last type of intention.
It is clear that at to, one of the goal formulas true in all goal accessible worlds is
inevitable(Of) (0 means eventually). This also implies that the agent believes that this goal
is achievable; in other words, Bel (optional (Of)). From the beliefs, goals, and intentions of
the agent, one can say that the agent believes that, if she succeeds in doing d\, she will
achieve the goal/
3.3 Interaction in multi-agent system
The concept of interaction is in the center of problems surrounding multi-agent
systems [Demazeau and Muller, 1991]. Interaction is a dynamic comparison of two or
several agents by a reciprocal action. This interaction allows agents to increase their power,
reach their goals, communicate their knowledge, increase the speed at which they carry out
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a task, etc. Interaction between agents is also at the origin of conflicts caused by
divergences from objectives and opinions, in short, by the fact that they interact.
3.3.1 Interaction's situations
There are multitudes of situations able to give an opportunity for the agents to
interact. It is possible to classify these various situations compared to three main criteria:
the objectives of the agents, the relations which the agents maintain towards the resources
they have and the means (or competences) they have to achieve their goals [Ferber, 1995].
These criteria enable us to make a typology of the interaction situations, as shown in table
3.1. We can see that when the goals of the agents are compatible, it is possible, and in
several cases even desirable, for the agents to cooperate with one another. However, when
their goals are incompatible, a multitude of conflicts arise.
Table 3.1 : Classification of interaction situations
Goals
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Incompatible
Incompatible
Incompatible
Incompatible
Ressources
Sufficient
Sufficient
Insufficient
Insufficient
Sufficient
Sufficient
Insufficient
Insufficient
Competences
Sufficient
Insufficient
Sufficient
Insufficient
Sufficient
Insufficient
Sufficient
Insufficient
Types of situation
Indépendance
Simple Collaboration
Obstruction
Co-ordinate
Collaboration
Individual Competition
Collective Competition
Individual Conflits
Collectives Conflits
Category
Indifference
Cooperation
Antagonism
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Simple Collaboration (delegation): this type of situation consists of a simple
addition of competences not requiring any coordination between speakers. For
instance, an agent not being competant to carry out a task could quite simply
carry it out through another agent [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998b].
Obstruction: this type of situation involves agents mutually obstructing the
accomplissement of their tasks when they are not interdépendant. For example,
problems with network obstruction can come about when distant agents carry out
too much communication.
Coordinated Collaboration: this type of situation implies that agents have to
coordinate their actions to achieve their goals [Ciancarini et al, 1999]. Not
having either resources, or necessary competencies, agents must cooperate.
Suppose that a robot extractor of ore could cooperate with a specialized robot in
the search of ore. The first robot could coordinate its actions and extract the ore
only once the second has identified a layer.
Individual Competition: this type of situation occurs when the agents have
incompatible objectives. In other words, objective achievement implies that the
others will not be able to carry out their own objectives. For example, if the
objective of two agents consists of winning a part of failures that they have
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disputed together, the realization of the goal will necessarily invoke failure for
the other.
• Collective Competition: this type of situation occurs when agents having
incompatible goals do not have the necessary competencies to carry out their
objectives. In this case, the agents must gather within coalitions in order to
acheive their goals. A characteristic example is a team competition, as in a match
of soccer [Spaan, 2002].
• Individual Conflicts for Resources: this type of situation implies that the agents'
resources are insufficient and cannot be divided. Access to resources thus
becomes a source of conflict, where each agent tries to acquire sufficient
resources to achieve its goals; such as several programs in competition for the use
of a peripheral or printer at the same time.
• Collective Conflicts for Resources: this type of situation combines the collective
competition with the individual conflict for resources. For example we can think
of several robots playing a game of soccer being in a collective competition to
obtain the one and only resource: the ball (Robocup'97) [Tambe et al, 1997].
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3.3.2 Cooperation
Cooperation is defined as being the pooling of resources and competence of a group
of agents in order to achieve a common goal, and/or with the augmentation of their mutual
performance [Galliers, 1991] [Doran et al, 1997]. For example, in the case of robot
extractors of ore, we could think that their regrouping would result in a simple summation
of their individual performances. In other words, if a robot brings back 10 kilos of ore per
hour, 5 robots working in concert will bring back 50 kilos of ore per hour. However, the
improvement of their performances could be much more than linear; suppose that if certain
robots concentrate on digging the ore and that the others bring the ore back, the robots'
individual efficiency could go from 10 to 12 kilos per hour. In order to observe this
increase, we would need to quantify performance improvement with the help of an index.
In this case, the index improvement could be calculated in the following way:
^improvement ~ * total ~ ((Pind x n) + a)
Ptotai •' the rough total performance of the robots
PM : the individual performance of an agent
n : the number of the agents
a : the lost performance in the management of the cooperation
There are two large classes concerning cooperation:
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a) Cooperation as an intentional attitude: this school of thoughts states that
cooperation is the result of an attitude the agents have of wanting to cooperate
after having identified a common goal [Galliers, 1991]. For example, two agents
needing the mathematical result of a complex calculation could decide to
associate with one another, so that each one carries out half of the calculation
task then sharing the result. This intentional decision on behalf of the agents
would thus constitute the proof of a true will to cooperate.
b) Cooperation from the viewpoint of the observator: the kind of thought
considers cooperation as a qualification of the activity of a group of agents by
an external observer not having mental access to the agents' state. For instance,
if we can qualify the behavior of cooperative ants, it is because, as an observer,
we note a certain number of phenomena we use as indices cooperative activity.
It is thus possible to define units of observable indices (resource sharing,
parallelization actions, etc.) allowing us to qualify a situation as being co-
operative [Durfee et ai, 1989] [Bouron, 1992].
The enigma of cooperation is summarized by the following formula [Ferber,
1995]:
Cooperation = collaboration + coordination + resolving conflicts
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3.3.2.1 Collaboration
This technique consists of making several agents work on a project by distributing
tasks, information and resources so as to work toward a common goal - task sharing
technique - [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998b]. The solution, which is used for the
distributed task, is brought by using a coordinating agent [Tambe, 1997] [Tuomas, 1997].
Thus, this agent will be seen giving out roles to distribute the tasks to the available agents,
according to their competence and needs. This type of system uses negotiable approaches
based on contract protocol [Davis and Smith, 1987]. It consists of distributing the tasks
according to the agents' competence and availabilities. With this intention, the centralized
agent uses a mutual representation model of the capacities of each one, called a contract net
protocol [Gasser et ai, 1987].
3.3.2.2 Coordination
This technique supposes that management of all agents generates a certain number
of additional tasks, called coordination tasks, which are not directly productive, but are
used so that the productive actions can be achieved under the best conditions [Durfee and
Lesser, 1991]. For example, a conveying robot cannot bring back ore if it is not extracted
beforehand. A formal model for the implantation coordination system was proposed by
Ciancarini [Ciancarini et al, 1999]. The coordination of the various agents' tasks can thank
to a coordinating agent (it is the case for the distribution of tasks) or these tasks can be
organised directly between two or more agents. The other recent methods were also
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suggested, like shared plans [Grosz and Kraus, 1998], joint intentions [Jennings, 1992],
delegation and adoption [Haddadi, 1996].
3.3.2.3 Conflict resolution
Life in society, a human society or agents society, implies the appearance of
conflicts. For example, conflicts appear when several agents want to use the same resources
at the same time or there is a contradiction between the various beliefs, intentions or goals
of the agents [Chaudron et al, 2000]. Physical conflit occurring on the resource level are
called extrinsic conflict or non-analytical conflict [Castelfranchi, 2000]. The objectives of
the agents are not logically contradictory or divergent, but they become incompatible
because they do not have sufficient resources enabling agents to be able to achieve their
goals. The conflict of knowledge is at the level of knowledge. It occurs when the beliefs,
knowledge or the plans of the agents' actions are contradictory or divergent. It can also be
called intrinsic conflict or analytical conflict. Suppose that if an agent A believes in a reality
p and the agent B denies this same reality, they are in contradiction. There is not the
ambiguity in situation.
3.3.2.4 Delegation
The delegation applies mainly with the tasks. An agent wants to delegate one or
more tasks to another agent, in a gesture of cooperation [Haddadi, 1996]. For example, an
agent asks another agent to carry out a complicated mathematical calculation. This form of
delegation is widespread so far. It is also possible to discuss delegation of roles [Werner,
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1990]. An agent can have a hierarchical statute in regrouping of agents, which constitutes
its social role. Thus, this role can also be delegated, in a temporary or permanent way, with
another agent. Finally, it is possible to carry out a delegation of control. When an agent is
in control of an unfolding situation, it can delegate this control to another agent for various
reasons, without yielding its role to him.
In this field, a lot of work has been done by Castelfranchi and Falcone
[Castelfranchi and Falcone, (1997, 1998b, 2000)], which are with the original model of the
delegation and the adoption of goals based on the plans [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998b].
This model suggests that a delegation is taken into account in mental state of the delegant
agent. The given action is always used to reach a certain state, which can be perceived as a
goal, the delegation of an action implies the adoption by another agent a pair action/goal
noted T = (a, g). By the symbol r, we refers to an action a, which produces a result, a goal
g. Ultimately, that means an agent A\ which delegates an action or which needs the result of
an action that carried out by an agent A2, will include this action in its plan as if it executes
itself, such as we can see it on figure 3.4.
The agent Ai delegates a part of its plan of actions, that means the actions a^ and as
will be realized by the agent A2. However, it is noted that the agent A] keeps the execution
of those interior plan. We can also note that the agent A2 adopts a certain part of the object
g of the agent just like state S6. Then we will be able to say that the agent A2 adopted a
certain part of the plan of A/s actions.
Intentions A
T+ 1
T + 2
T + 3
Beliefs A
Agent/1, J Delegation
actions (a3 a5)
Objects .4,
g
Adoption
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Figure 3.4 : The model of delegation
3.4 Conclusion
Because we are interested in how trust operates in social agents, in this chapter, we
introduced the concept of the agent. There are at least two reasons why it is too difficult to
define precisely what agents are. Firstly, agent researchers do not "own" this term in the
same way as fuzzy logicians/AI researchers, for example, own the term "fuzzy logic" - it is
one that is used widely in everyday parlance as in travel agents, estate agents, etc.
Secondly, even within the software fraternity, the word "agent" is really an umbrella term
for a heterogeneous body of research and development. For this reason, we analyze agent
properties and try to define them using the formula with three triplets. Then, in order to
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really understand the definition of the agent, we represent the existing Multi-agent system
definition, which could conceivably be used in distributed domains to introduce different
types of agents.
In our study, we are particularly interested in the interaction among agents. In those
approaches to the study of rational agents, the BDI model has been received a great deal of
attention. This model is not only the abstract architecture of a family of parallel and
distributed systems working alone or in a team in dynamic environments, but also it has a
number of applications. It adds a high degree of sophistication and sensitivity to the context
when deciding how to react to changed conditions. Depending on design and
implementation choices, agents in the BDI model can show very different levels of reactive
(event driven) and planned (goal driven) behavior. The description of this behavior is done
in cognitive terms, i.e., by attributing mental attitudes. Research is being conducted in a
number of areas of relevance both to computer and cognitive sciences, such as cooperative
work and social commitments and recognition of intentions [Rao, 1994].
In order to build formally verifiable and practical systems, we introduced a
formalization of intentions based on a branching-time possible-worlds model and BDI
semantic. We consider them to lay a foundation for our study, in the next chapter, in which
we will represent our opinion and hypothesis about how to ensure the trust between the user
and its agent acting on the user's behalf.
CHAPTER 4
MUTUAL TRUST MODEL FOR USER IN THE LOOP
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4.1 Introduction
The goal of our work is to dig out principles and rules of trust between user and
agent acting on his behalf. The cohabitation between the user and the agent differs from the
agent-agent cohabitation because the specificity appears in the difficulty of modeling the
user, and there is no model providing a kind of user-agent bijection because the proposed
theories rest on hypotheses based on reduction [Grislin-Le, 1998] [Tessier et al, 2001]. The
user-agent cohabitation is classified according to the balance between the exerted control
by the user and that by the agent. In our case, the agent is regarded as a teammate who
interacts with the user to achieve jointly a common goal. In other words, the user and the
agent have the same possibilities of proposing, refusing, stopping the other, etc. that is,
what we call a user in the loop.
Therefore the most difficult question is however not how to share the task, but how
to measure trust on the user or the agent, which is particularly significant when the task is
critical. Our proposal is to consider mutual trust between the pair user-agent according to
the similarity of the viewpoints, or opinions based on beliefs, goals and plans of the task by
using the terminological logic [Nebel, 1995] [Baader et al., 2003]. This metric not only
makes it possible to make safe task delegation, but also to answer the tiresome task of
trying to mediate between two diverging concepts like control and autonomy based on trust
for designing human computer system [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2000].
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4.2 Terminological logic
The measure of mutual trust is based on the terminological logic, which seems to
suit better the cohabitation context by relocating the problems of measuring the trust into a
terminological classification problem [Bouzouane, Bouchard and Shen, 2003]. We can
define terminological logic as being a formalism representation of knowledge, which is
divided into two quite distinct parts: the terminological part, which makes it possible to
define a whole of concepts like their roles, and the assessment part, which allows the
individual creation pertaining to the various concepts of the terminological part. The
assessment part of formalism allows the operations of classification and inference. The
classification, which constitutes the base of the reasoning in terminological logic, supports
the relation of subsumption, which allows the concepts' organization and the roles in a
hierarchy of terms.
4.3 Mutual trust approach
Our theoretical approach is based on the concept of the viewpoint. A viewpoint is
an opinion defined as a terminological structure based on the concepts of beliefs, goals and
plans. Figure 4.1 shows us an example of a user and an agent that express their viewpoints
in a controlled context of an enterprise's stock. In this example, the user and the agent have
exactly the same beliefs, meaning that both of them believe in a lack of product, and also
have the same objective, to purchase products. However, the agent actions plan is only
partial, because it plans to order products but it does not select the supplier. Its plans consist
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User Agent
Beliefs
Lack of
Product market
Plans
Contact supplier X
Determine the delivery date Y
Plans
Find wholesalers
Negotiate the price
Check the product
Determine the delivery date
Goals
Buy the product
Figure 4.1 : An example of viewpoint
in finding a wholesaler, negotiating the price of the product, checking the quality of the
product and finally determining a delivery date. On the other side, the user has a plan of
action that is not packed, but complete. It wishes to contact a supplier «X» which has
known and fixed with a date «Y». In other words, this example shows us an entity (the
user) able to specify its needs without being ready to specify all the details of its actions
plan and his/her colleague (the agent), which define his actions plan in detail by taking his
information in his database.
These two opinions are similar even though they use different vocabularies and
constraints. For example, the actions of «contact supplier» and «find wholesalers» share
subsumption relation. A subsumption is an inference method in the terminological logic, to
classify an object within taxonomy of objects. Therefore, rather than communicating
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directly with the agent or losing the control to the benefit of the user, we first propose to
compare their viewpoints by using the terminological logic and then measure the mutual
trust based on a classification before delegation of the transaction takes place.
4.3.1 Similarity notion
The concept of similarity generally indicates a relation of resemblance between two
or several objects [Larousse, 1980]. It can be defined as the sum of the points or the
common characteristics between two objects. Thus, to measure the similarity it can be
reduced to determine the number of common characteristics between two objects,
comparatively with the total number of their characteristics [Diday et al, 2000]. Suppose
that the two states p and q imply one number of the other states, which can represent their
characteristics:
p=>(a/\b Ac Ad)
q=> (a Ab Ae Aj)
Moreover, both of them include the two states a and b, which constitute their
common characteristics. We could represent the similarity between the states p and q in the
following way:
SMpq=(aAb)
On the other hand, in order to be able to determine if two objects are similar, it is
also necessary that they have comparable characteristics or components. It is difficult to
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affirm that a television set is similar with a washing machine, because we cannot really
compare their respective characteristics. In our case, before measuring the similarity of the
viewpoints concepts, we guarantee their semantic equality by checking the existence of a
subsumption relation between each concept. Ultimately, we define the similarity as a
quantitative measurement of the resemblances, which exist between two comparable
objects.
4.3.2 Viewpoint concept
A viewpoint can be defined as being an unspecified representation of mental states
of an entity (user or agent) by the given situation. In fact, it means the opinion of the entity
about the resolution of a problem. In our case, we will define the viewpoint of an entity by
the help of the terminological structure. Thus, we will use the concepts of beliefs, goals and
plans of action.
In order to be able to handle, analyze and compare the points of the user's and of
agent's view, we propose to use terminological structure for the representation that is
shown in figure 4.2.
The concept of supplier subsumes (subsumption relation is represented by the
symbol <) the concept of the wholesaler, which means that all the characteristics or the
roles of the supplier subsume the characteristics of the wholesalers. The concept of the user
viewpoint represented by VP" is defined as a conjunction of the viewpoint and the beliefs
81
VP" s(n VIEWPOINT
( Vbeliefs ( Vmissing -product PRODUCT))
( Vplans (( ^' contact-supplier SUPPLIER)
(3s1 determine-date-supply DA TE))
( Vgoals ( Vpurchasing- product PRODUCT)))
WHOLESALER < SUPPLIER.
SUPPLIER =(nE-MARKET( Vselling PRODUCT)).
VP^^in VIEWPOINT
(Vbeliefs ( Vmissing -product PRODUCT))
( Vplans ( Vfind - wholesalers WHOLESALER)
(I?1 find - wholesalers)
(Vcheck-item CHECKING)
( V determine-price PA YMENT)
(if' determine-date-supply DATE))
( Vgoals ( Vpurchasing-product PRODUCT)))
Figure 4.2 : Opinions based on terminological logic (Concept is in capital letter and a role
in lower letter)
concerning all entities filling the «missing product» roles. The plan of VP" consists of at
most one specific supplier (represented by if1 as a constraint), at most one date of supply
and all goals to purchase a product. Notice that the concept of the supplier subsumes the
concept of the wholesaler. The supplier is defined as a concept of an e-market of entities
with selling roles. On the other hand, the viewpoint of the agent represented by VP4 is
defined as a conjunction of the viewpoint and the beliefs concerning all products having
«missing - product» roles. The plan of VP4 consists of at least one product wholesaler
(represented by 5^; as a constraint). The found product has a checking and a price role, and
at least one date of supply for each item. All goals concern the concepts of having the
purchasing product roles.
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By using the classification based on subsumption procedure between concepts, we
deduce that the role of «contact supplier» with its constraints subsumes «find wholesalers»
role. Consequently, the viewpoint of the user subsumes that of the agent.
4.3.3 Trust of the agent
Two similar concepts are not necessarily cloned, but they share a subsumption
relation. From there, the user trusts an agent acting on his behalf if the viewpoint of the user
subsumes that of the agent. Let us simplify and formalize this:
(VP4 < VP" => User trusts the agent) <z>
(VC4 eVP4 3C" eVP" \ C4 <C" ASFC(C", C4) e[0,1])
Where: C4 represents the concept inferred by the agent according to its opinion and
C11 represents the concept proposed by the user. The Similarity Factor of Concepts
represented by SFC (C11, C4) is evaluated when the semantic equality between the two
concepts (C4, C11) given by the subsumption relation C4 < C11. This factor is used to
estimate the degree of the credibility of trust, and it is defined like an average of similarity
factor of each role making up the concepts. Thus this factor is not a subjective weight fixed
arbitrarily but it is evaluated by a generic formula such as the following:
83
Min(CH,CA )
SFC (C", CA)=[ £ SFD (rolej"> roleJA) x [(SFN (roleJH' rolef)
+SFV(role", rolef)/2]]/Max(Cf1, C4)
Min (Cf1, C4): is the minimal number of roles between the compared concepts
C4) of each viewpoint.
Max (Cf1, C4): is the maximal number of roles between the compared concepts
, C4) of each viewpoint.
SFD: indicates the Similarity Factor of the Domain which models the semantic
equality between the j-th role «rolej » from the concept of the user's viewpoint,
and its correspondence j-th role «role" » from the agent. We denote by Dj1 the
domain of «rolej1» and Df the domain of «role/». This factor SFD is equal to
Min(Djh, Df) /Max(Djh, Df), ifD-1 <Df or Df <Djh andj e [1, Min(Djh, Df)]. In
the contrary case the factor is reduced to 0.
SFN indicates the Similarity Factor of the Name of the roles. This factor is equal
to 1 if the two roles are identical or synonymous. In the contrary case the factor is
reduced to 0. At each case of subsumption between the roles, the synonymous
database is updated.
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- SFV indicates the Similarity Factor of the Values of the atomic roles. This factor
is equal to 1 when the two values of roles are atomic and identical. If the role is
not atomic, the above formula is used in a recursive way.
4.3.4 Trust of the user
The agent make credible in the user if the viewpoint of the agent subsumes that of
the user. This formalize as below:
(VP" < VP4 => Agent trusts the user) <=>
(Vd1 eVP" 3C4 eVP4 \ C" <C* ASFC^, C4) e[0,l])
The similarity factor represented by SFC (C11, C4) is evaluated when the semantic
equality between the two concepts (C4, C") given by the subsumption relation C" <C* is
guaranteed.
4.3.5 Mutual trust
There is a mutual trust between the user and his agent if only if the semantic
equality of their viewpoints is guaranteed. This is formalized as follows:
(VP4 = VP11 => Mutual trust between user and agent) <=>
(VP4 <VP" AVP" <VP* A MTrust(VP", VP4) e [0,1])
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The mutual trust is a computational metric related to the similarity of concepts
making up each viewpoint of the user and his agent. It is defined by the following formula:
MTrust(VP", VPA) =
Min(VP" , VP")
SFC (C", CjA) x Utility (VP", VP4) /Max (VP", VPA)
The mutual trust is represented by MTrust(VP", VP4) and belongs to [0,1]
interval.
, VP4) is the minimal number of concepts compared between (VP*1,
VP4)
Max(VPH, VP4) is the maximal number of concepts compared between (VP11,
VP4)
UtilityfVP", VP4) is the utility function that expresses the importance of the
mutual trust. This utility value normalized over [0, 1], is measure of how much
net benefit if the entity (user or agent) that is taking the trust. It can be estimated
arbitrarily or in terms of payoff function [Rosenschein, 1985].
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In our case, we use the formula from Marsh's work [Marsh, 1994]: Utility =
(Benefit - Cost) / Benefit, to realize the utility. Here, benefit is the possible gains
from their cooperation. Suppose that in electronic commercial, the price difference
of products between Internet purchasing and other medium purchasing can be as the
benefit. In other side, cost means the value measured by what must be given or done
or undergone to obtain something. The purchasing price of the products, the price of
Internet, etc, can be thought as cost.
- If MTrustfVP", VF4) = 1 => These two viewpoints are equivalent and the
mutual trust is total.
- lî MTrustCVP", VP4) < 1 => These two viewpoints are divergent and the mutual
trust is partial.
A mutual trust is not an arbitrary computational metric without a real content, but it
is based on the similarity of mental attitudes that support the decision of the common task
delegation.
4.3.6 Trust and risk
The delegation by a user or an agent is the subject to the mutual trust according to
the level of risk associated with the task. In our case, we use the formula of Marsh [Marsh,
1994] to calculate risk:
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_. . Cost
 ± ,
Risk = * Importance
Benefit
Here, Importance is an agent-centered or subjective judgment of a situation on the
part of the agent concerned. It is a subjective measure of the expected benefits to be gained
from a situation under consideration.
If MTrustÇVP^, VP4) < Risk, then the takeover is refused. In this case, the system
will seek to integrate the viewpoint until MTrust(VP", VP4) >Risk is satisfied. Therefore the
measurement of the mutual trust enables us to decide at what stage we can make a safe
delegation of tasks to a teammate.
4.3.7 Mutual trust and security
Our study attempts to find a quantitative formula to trust. The above formula shows
trust MTrustfVP", VP4) is influenced by utility and the similarity factor of the concepts of
the agent's opinions. However, we think it exists other important factors. According to a
study by Business Week (2000) [Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002], 61% of the survey
respondents indicate that they would transact on the Internet if the security and privacy of
their personal information could be adequately protected. Therefore, we should consider
security as one of the factors influencing trust and we extend our formula as follows:
MTrust(VP", VP4) =
Min(VP" , VP\
Security x SFC (C", Cf) x Utility (VP", VP4)
/Max (VP", VPA)
Here, we use the formula from Pavlou's work [Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002] in order
to estimate the security factor and it is as follows:
Security = 0.19* Encryption + 0.29 x Protection + 0.15 x Authentication
+0.11 x Verification
4.3 J.I Empirical test
From the above formula, we know the factors, which influence trust are security,
utility and similarity factors of concept of different viewpoints. Now we want to know if
these factors are significant for trust. Therefore we will use regression analysis [Kleinbaum
et al, 1998] to measure these factors. The goal of regression analysis is to determine the
values of parameters for a function that cause the function to best fit a set of data
observations provided. In order to obtain a satisfied result, at first, an empirical study was
performed to evaluate the proposed scales and validate the proposed set of inter-
relationships related to trust. Thus, participants were asked to assess the degree of trust they
would expect from security, utility and SFC with whom they have little experience. The
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anchors for all items were "l=strongly disagree" to "3=neither agree nor disagree" and
"5=strongly agree".
The final result shows (see the appendix, figure 1): the effect of security (Pi = 0.36,
prob(t) < 0.01), utility (fr = 0.29, prob(t) < 0.01) and SFC (p3 = 0.33, prob(t) < 0.01) on
trust are significant. The model coefficient was extremely significant (F=331.20, prob(F)<
0.001), and the data explained a substantial degree of the variation (R2 = 0.97). Table 4.1
shows the result.
4.4 Validation
The concrete case being used as a validation relates to the electronic commerce. In
recent years, many researchers as well as commercial companies have attempted to create
intelligent agent based market on the Web. Within the user-agent cohabitation framework,
an agent or a user can intervene at any time to take part in the realization of the transaction.
We use Java language and PowerLoom [PowerLoom] as a terminological system
for knowledge representation of viewpoints. When a purchasing agent or a selling agent, is
started, it creates a view point of the situation using several rules which forms its
knowledge base relating to the market and the profile of the other agents. This point of
view is transmitted via Internet to its user, as shown by the following figure 4.3. The
viewpoints of user and its agent are represented with Java objects. Suppose that in order to
take the control of the transaction, we make a decision the two viewpoints are converted in
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Table 4.1 : Regression analysis for the factors of trust
Variables
Security
Utility
SFC
Trust
0.36
0.29
0.33
T-value
24.19
18.92
21.99
R' 0.97 0.97 (adjusted)
F ratio 331.20
prob(t) < 0.01
• The T statistic tests the hypothesis that a population regression coefficient is 0
when the other predictors are in the model.
• Prob(t) labels the P values or the observed significance levels for the t statistics.
The P values tell us whether a variable has statistically significant predictive
capability in the presence of the other variables, that is, whether it adds
something to the equation.
• The F Value is the test statistic used to decide whether the model as a whole has
statistically significant predictive capability, that is, whether the regression is big
enough, considering the number of variables needed to achieve it.
• R2 is the squared multiple correlation coefficient. It is the proportion of the
variability in the response that is accounted for by the model. If a model has
perfect predictability, R2=l. If a model has no predictive capability, R2=0.
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the PowerLoom terminology by a translator, therefore we use the inference engine of
PowerLoom to determine if there is a relation of subsumption between these two points of
view. Finally, when PowerLoom deduce a subsumption relation between the two points of
view, the evaluation of the mutual trust is engaged by using the previous formula.
4.4.1 Application's architecture
Here, we will use Bouchard's work [Bouchard, 2003] to achieve our goal. Figure
4.3 shows a completed application of electronic market's system. The two squares on the
left and on the right of the image correspond respectively to the client and server part,
which make the system.
The server part constitutes the electronic market as a whole. It includes the agents,
the interface of communication between the agents and the market itself. This part is built
in the interior of the component EJB (Undertaken Java Bean) [Deitel and Deitel, 2000] who
executes via a server of E-trade IBM WebAphere [WebAphere]. This server of E-trade
manages all the communications between the client part and the various components and
the safety. For these intentions, this server uses RMI technology [Deitel and Deitel, 2000].
The agents are created directly by this server and they do not move. Therefore, the
application must make a request to the server part so that the server creates an agent on the
market A certain number of parameters, such as the type of the agent (salesman or
purchaser), the type of product compromised, the various scales of price and the
information concerning the product, will have to be sent to the market so that the server
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creates an agent answering the criteria. Market will return then a number of the agent's
identification to the application client, thus enabling the client to contact the new agent
directly.
The client part constitutes the tool of the user. This part uses the interface of the
application client to connect to the market. It requires visualizing what occurs on the
market. We can see the interface of the client application on figure 4.4, also makes it
possible to the user to contact his agent, so obtain its point of view on the market situation.
ffc Human / Agent Cohabitation
Agent Context Application Administration
9 C3 Trust
9 Q Security
0 Encryption[0.61
0 Protection[0.7]
0 Autrtentication(0.5)
0 Verification[0.81
9 CD Utility
Q Benefit[20.0$I
: 9 • cost
0 PurchasingPrice[4.0$]
• 0 lnternetPrice[2.0$]
<? Q GOALa D
©• C3 Selling-Product B
9 C3PUNaB
» O FindWholesaler D
O • DetermineDateSupply Q
©• G NegociatePrice Q
oC3DetermineModePaymentD
©• Q Checkltem 0
9 C3 BELIEFa 0
9 O Market D
0 State_Market [Saturation! |v |
Virtual Abdenour is now working!
receiving transaction
Trust
9 C3Risk
9 E3 Benefit
D SoldPrice|20.0$]
9 Cil Cost
0 PurchasingPrice[4.0$)
D internetPrice[2.0$]
9 C3 Importance
: D lnterface[0.72]
D Time[0.39]
D Effect[0.69]
|9 CJVPh
I D GOALh 0
D PLANh D
D BELIEFh 0
Figure 4.4 : Interface of the client application
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Agent's viewpoint will be shown in figure 4.5. It will be able to then compare this one with
its own point of view.
<? C3vPa
Ç C3 GOALa D
©-C3 SellingProduct D ; H
Ç C3 PLWa D
oca
oca
©-a
©-C3
DetermineDateSupply 0
NegociatePrice D
FindWholesalerQ
DetermineModePayment Q
Checkltem D
<? C3 BËŒFa Q
9C3 Market D
D state_Market [Saturation] ^T
Figure 4.5 : Window of agent's viewpoint
When the user starts of the activities, he will choose his viewpoint as figure 4.6
showing. The viewpoint of the agent and the user are represented respectively in the
different windows of the interface. The user can intervene constantly to modify his
viewpoint.
C3VPh
GOALh Q
D Goal
Checkltem
ContactSupplier
Plan •
Belief »
DetermineDateSupply ! Attribute •
DetermineModePayment j object •
NegociatePrice Remove
Figure 4.6 : Window of user's viewpoint
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4.4.2 Evaluation scenario
Here we give an example to illustrate how to proceed by using our formula in order
to estimate the mutual trust. Suppose that an agent (virtual manager) proposes to sell one
kind of product in its stock, because it believes that the market of the product tends to
saturation. Thus it wants to liquidate its stock, and its plan consists of finding a wholesaler,
determining the delivery date, checking items, determining the payment mode and
negotiating the price of product. On the contrary, a manager intends to purchase the product
with a certain quantity because he believes that the market is in progress. His restocking
plan consists in contacting suppliers and determining the delivery date according to
potential suppliers. According to the example, in figure 4.7, we will show the similarity
factors of the viewpoints between the user and the agent acting on his behalf.
VP
I
l i
ypH ypA
I !
Beliefs Beliefs
(the market is in progress) (the market tends to saturation)
Goals Goals
(purchasing the product) (selling the product)
Plans: Plans:
(contacting the suppliers of product) (finding wholesalers)
(determining the delivery date) (determining the delivery date)
(Check items)
(determining the payment mode)
(negotiating the price)
Figure 4.7 : Comparison from viewpoints
Using our formula, a value of viewpoints is represented as follows:
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Min(VP", VPA )
SFC (VP", VPA)=[ £ SFDfrolej", role/) x [(SFNfrolef , role/) +
SFVfrole", role/)]/2]/Max(VP", VP4)
Here, we have 3 roles: belief, goal and plan, so Min (VP", VP4) = 3 and Max (VP",
VP4) = 3. For each role, firstly, «Belief», we can calculate it as follows:
Min(BeliefH, BeliefA )
SFC (Belief, Belief) =[ £ SFD(theMarketH, theMarket4)
[(SFN(theMarketH, theMarket4) +SFV(theMarketH,
theMarket4)] / 2] /Max(Belief, Belief)
The object Belief and Belief are the root objects of the beliefs from each
viewpoint. Min (Belief, Belief) =1 and Max (Belief, Belief) = 1. Each object
«Beliefiy from each viewpoint has only one attribute, which is «theMarket».
- SFD(theMarketH, theMarket*) = 1. Because the names of the two attributes
refer to the same domain: Market.
- SFN(theMarketH, theMarket4) = 1. Because the two attributes are identical.
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MinftheMarket", theMarket* )
SFV(theMarketH, theMarket4) =[ £
SFD(state Market", stateJAarket4) x f(SFN(state_MarketH,
stateJdarket4) +SFV(state_Market", stateJMarker1)]/!] /
Max(theMarketH, theMarket)
Where:
Min (theMarket", theMarket4) = 1 and Max (theMarket"theMarkef') =1.
It is because the class «theMarket» in the two viewpoints is characterized by
one attribute, which is «state_Market».
- SFD(state_Market", state_Market4) = 1. Because the names of the two
attributes refer to the same domain: «String».
- SFN(state_Market", stateJAarkef*) = 1. Because the attributes are
identical.
- SFV(state_Market", state_Marketi) = SFV(«progress», «saturation»)
= 0.
Thus,
SFC (theMarket", theMarkef4) = 1 x (1 + 0) / 2=0.5,
SFC(Belief, Belief) = 1 * (1 + 0.5) /2=0.75.
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The user and the agent do not completely have the same beliefs completely, but they
relate to the same object, which is «theMarket». They have similar beliefs 75% of which
can be integrated. In other words, they are divergent to 25% because the user believes the
state of market is «Progression» and the agent believes that is «Saturation».
According to the same step, the remaining roles can be calculated. Secondly, we
calculate «Goal» as follows:
Min(Goal", Goal* )
SFC (Goaf, Goaf) =[ £ SFD(PurchasingProduct",
SellingProducf) x [(SFN(PurchasingProduct", SellingProducf4) +
SFV(PurchasingProductH, SellingProducfl)]/2] /' Max(Goalh', Goaf)
The object Goal" and Goaf are the root objects of the goals from each viewpoint.
Min (Goal", Goaf) = 1 and Max (Goaf, Goaf) = 1.
- SFD(PurchasingProducf, SellingProducf) = 1. Because the domains of the two
attributes refer to the same domain.
- SFN(PurchasingProducf, SellingProducf) - 0.
- SFV(PurchasingProductH, SellingProducf) = 0.
Thus, SFC(Goaf, Goaf) = 1 x (0+0) /2 = 0.
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This result means that the goal of the agent is «selling the product», and, on the
other hand, the goal of the user is «purchasing the product». These goals are semantically
different.
Finally, for «Plan» we can calculate as follows:
Min(Plan", Plan" )
SFC (Plan", PlanA) =[ £ SFD(role", role/) * f(SFN(role",
role/) + SFV(role", role/)]/2]/Max(Plan", PlanA)
The object Plan and PlanA are the root objects of the plans from each viewpoint.
Min (Plan", PlanA) = 5 and Max (Plan", PlanA) = 2.
- SFC(ContectSupplier", FindWholesale/) = 1 x (1 + 1) / 2 = 1,because there is a
subsumption relation between the «ContectSupplier» and «FindWholesaler».
- SFC(DetermineDateSupply", DetermineDateSupply4) = 1* (1 + 1 )/2 = 1.
Thus, SFC(PlanH, PlanA) =2/5 = 0.4.
The user and the agent do not completely have the same plans completely but the
agent's plans subsume the user's plans. They have similar plans, 40% of which can be
integrated. In other words, they are divergent to 60%, because the user's plans are partial.
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Finally, SFCfVP", VF4) = (0.75+0+0.4) /3 = 0.383 <1. We can get the conclusion:
these two points of view are divergent to 0.617 (1 - SFCfVP", VP4)) and they have similar
beliefs, 38.3% of which can be integrated. From there, we can say that there is a possibility
of cohabitation between the user and his agent because there is possibility of integration of
the viewpoints.
Meanwhile, we have to subjectively measure other factors such as: utility and
security. The formula of utility given in Section 4.3.5 and the arbitrary fixed values of its
factors are: benefit and cost. Here we suppose the price difference of products between
Internet store and physical store can be as the benefit, is twenty dollars. The purchasing
price of the products, the price of Internet, etc, can be thought as the cost, and they are
respectively four and two dollars. The formula of security given in Section 4.3.7 and the
arbitrary fixed values of its factors are: Encryption, Protection, Authentication and
Verification. Here we suppose they are respectively 0.6, 0.7, 0.5 and 0.8. Therefore, using
our formula, we can calculate the value of mutual trust. Finally, using the result to compare
the value of risk, we will decide if the delegation will be happened. The formula of risk
given in Section 4.3.6 and the arbitrary fixed values of its factors are benefit, cost and
importance. Here we suppose importance is influenced by user friendly Interface, Time and
Effect, and these values are respectively 0.72, 0.39 and 0.69. If risk >Mutual trust, the trust
of application will be refused, otherwise, it will be accepted. Therefore, the final result of
our case is shown in the following table:
SFC
Security
Utility
MTrust
Risk
0.38
0.48
0.70
0.12
0.18
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The implementation of the evaluation scenario is shown in figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8 : Result of viewpoints' comparison
The viewpoint of the agent is represented in the upper part of the window, and the
user in the lower part. The user can intervene constantly to modify his viewpoint. In the
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"trust" window of the interface, we can know the value of security of the agent and utility
of the trade. In the "risk" window, we can know the threshold of risk associated to the task.
During the development from the calculation, the «yellow» button is lit. If the trust is
allowed to continue the realization of the task in progress, the «green» button will be lit.
Otherwise, the «red» button is lit, and the trust will be refused to the applicant. The final
result of trust can be found in the middle window. For our case, the delegation was refused.
4.5 Conclusion
We described the challenge of mutual trust measurement as a computational
aspect between the opinions of the user operator and his agent acting on his behalf in order
to ensure a safe delegation of tasks in both sides. This measurement of this mutual trust, not
only minimizes the mutual reasoning, but also mediates between two diverging concepts
such as autonomy and control [Tambe et al., 2002].
In this chapter, we have supposed and analyzed theoretically our formula. We
have also made an empirical study so that we can find out the reliability of the model
proposed by the regression analysis. The proposed hypotheses in our work were tested with
some participants. Further nonlinear least squares regression analysis provides considerable
support for the proposed set of antecedents and consequences of trust. We are able to verify
empirically that the mechanisms of security, utility and SFC indeed influence trust, and we
find the effect of these factors are significant. According to many literatures [Marsh, 1994]
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[Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002], we can calculate these factors so that we can finally quantify
our formula.
Through our formula, our opinion is reflected: trust is subjective, but can be
quantifiable. It can compare with risk so that the user can make a decision if the delegation
will be executed. Meanwhile, risk can be as the degree to judge trust. Most of our ideas
come from the literature having been introduced in above parts in this thesis. They enrich
our knowledge about trust and give us a solid foundation.
CHAPTER 5
GENERAL CONCLUSION
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The objective of this thesis was to contribute to the advance of the agent trust
domain cooperation by the achievement of three fixed objectives. Our prime objective
consisted of analyzing and discussing "what is trust?" We have tried to give our hypothesis
and formula according to some theories and practical investigation in literatures, which
allow measuring the credibility of the trust of a user and his agent acting on his behalf. The
second objective consisted in proposing a mutual trust model based on the similarity of
opinions of user and his agent. This objective is achieved by re-using the study of
comparing viewpoints based on terminological logic initiated by studying Bouzouane's
work [Bouzouane, Bouchard and Shen, 2003]. The achievement of this goal made it
possible to show that our approach guarantees the semantic equality from these two points
of view before measuring theirs. The third and last objective consisted of validating our
theoretical approach by a case concert in electronic commerce. This objective was achieved
through, the development of the prototype of sales and purchases of products through e-
commerce. The realization of all of these objectives was carried out in three stages.
Initially, we carried out a review of the literature related to trust through various
angles. Such as a computational trust [Marsh, 1994], social trust [Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 2001], the relationship between trust and security [Pavlou and Ramnath, 2002], a
distributed cognition approach of trust [Chandrasekharan, 2002] and finally the relationship
between trust and risk [Griffiths and Luck, 1999] [Gefen et al, 2003]. This literature
provides a clear definition of trust and presents some mental ingredients relative with trust.
They implied trust is the mental background of delegation, so we can say trust is a
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subjective definition. Also these literatures gave us some formulae for trust, which are
useful in clarifying discussion of concept.
In fact, due to our focus on the trust between the user and his agent, BDI model
[Rao and Georgeff, 1992] supplies a basis for our research. That justifies why we
introduced it in the chapter 3. It is an approach to the study of the rational agency, which
has received a great deal of attention, being the so-called Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI)
model. However, current research on BDI model looks at cognitive issues and, for
multi-agent systems, is mostly concerned with the notions of shared beliefs, goals and
commitments, and how these are built and communicated [Kinny et al, 1994]. It does not
directly address any of the mentioned computational problems of trust.
At the second stage, we carried out a research detailed on the formula of mutual
trust. We compare a concept of the viewpoint with all concepts of another viewpoint, by
using the subsumption operators offered by the engine of inference of PowerLoom
[PowerLoom]. Once the semantic equality between two concepts is guaranteed by a
relation of subsumption, we use the formula that we defined in order to measure the mutual
trust in an objective way. This study was made while passing the access in review a
theoretical research, as above, and a practical investigation. In the investigation, we asked
some participants to answer our questions to help us to find if those supposed factors are
significant for trust.
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In the last stage, our work consists of validating the proposal model to realize an
application. We gave an example to illustrate how to work using our formula in order to
estimate the mutual trust. It is helpful to understand well our formula and our definition
about mutual trust.
It should be noted that we do not consider the proposed method for computing the
mutual trust as a definite answer to the various problems related to «human in the loop»
[Dautenhanhahn, 2001] but as a step in the direction of the generic evaluation method of
mutual trust between the user and his agent acting on his behalf. In this research, we do not
cover the integration of two subsumed viewpoints. We aim to work out principles and rules
based on necessary formula and terminological constructors to define a new common point
of view between the user and his agent, in the perspective of integrating the user and the
agent in the same loop of common task realization. Also this thesis does not constitute a
firm and final response to the problems about trust stated in our Introduction. However the
proposed approach must be regarded as a step ahead contributing to the evolution of the
field of the trust between the user and his agent.
From the practical point of view, our theoretical approach could be re-used in the
other classes of problems, such as the automated production and automatic piloting the
accidents, which is the result of a divergence of point of view between the pilot and the
autopilot [Kitano, 1996].
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Let us mention that an article, presented in the Seventh international conference on
International Association of Science and Technology for Development (IASTED'03)
[Bouzouane, Bouchard and Shen, 2003].
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APPENDIX 1
THE RESULT OF INVESTIGATION
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1: Title "example forTrust " ;
2:
3: Variable Security;
4: Variable Utility;
5: Variable SFC;
6: Variable Trust;
7:
8: Parameter BO;
9: Parameter Bl;
10: Parameter B2;
11: Parameter B3;
12:
13: Function Trust = BO + Bl* Security + B2* Utility + B3* SFC ;
14: Data;
Beginning computation...
Stopped due to: Both parameter and relative function convergence.
Final Results
NLREG version 6.1
Copyright (c) 1992-2004 Phillip H. Sherrod.
example forTrust
Number of observations = 30
Maximum allowed number of iterations = 500
Convergence tolerance factor = 1.OOOOOOE-OlO
Stopped due to: Both parameter and relative function convergence.
Number of iterations performed = 3
Final sura of squared deviations = 2.1789566E-002
Final sum of deviations = 5.5511151E-017
Standard error of estimate = 0.0289493
Average deviation = 0.0226907
Maximum deviation for any observation = 0.0633329
Proportion of variance explained (R*2) = 0.9745 (97.451)
Adjusted coefficient of multiple determination (Ra"2) = 0.9716 (97.161)
Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation = 1.476
Analysis completed 14-Jan-2OO4 17:18. Runtime = 0.05 seconds.
t3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Variable Minimum value Maximum value Mean value Standard dev.
Security
Utility
SFC
Trust
1
1
1
1
0.5233333
0.5566667
0.4533333
0.5103333
0.3757139
0.3578512
0.3766763
0.1716549
Parameter
0
0
0
0
Calculated Parameter Values
Initial guess Final estimate Standard errorresul
* - * •
o
n
v
e:stigatio
3
Source
Regression
Error
Total
BO
Bl
B2
B3
DF Sum
3
26
29
1
1
1
i-i
Analysis of
of Squares
0.8327071
0.02178957
0.8544967
0.00739905428
0.360754244
0.294660925
0.331128624
Variance
Mean Square F
0.277569
0.0008380602
0.
0.
0.
0.
value
331.20
01701085
01491643
01557039
01505602
Prob(F)
0.00001
Prob(t)
0.43 0.66718
24.19 0.00001
18.92 0.00001
21.99 0.00001
O
